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Abstract
Several commentators have argued that financial “reform” legislation enacted
after a market crash is invariably flawed, results in “quack corporate governance” and
“bubble laws,” and should be discouraged. This criticism has been specifically directed at
both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. This article presents a rival
perspective. Investors, it argues, are naturally dispersed and poorly organized and so
constitute a classic “latent group” (in Mancur Olson’s terminology). Such latent groups
tend to be dominated by smaller, but more cohesive and better funded special interest
groups in the competition to shape legislation and influence regulatory policy. This
domination is interrupted, however, by major crises, which encourage “political
entrepreneurs” to bear the transaction costs of organizing latent interest groups to take
effective action. But such republican triumphs prove temporary, because, after the crisis
subsides, the hegemony of the better organized interest groups is restored.
As a result, a persistent cycle that this article calls the “Regulatory Sine Curve”
can be observed: the legislative success of the latent investor group is followed by
increasingly equivocal implementation of the new legislation, tepid enforcement, and
eventual legislative erosion. This article traces that pattern with respect to both the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the ongoing implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act.
This article does not deny that “reform” legislation often contains flaws (as does
much deregulatory legislation). But these are usually quickly eliminated in the latter half
of the cycle. The greater dilemma is instead whether the problem of systemic risk can be
satisfactorily addressed in the presence of the Regulatory Sine Curve.

Keywords: Dodd-Frank Act, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, financial regulation, latent group,
securities regulation, regulatory sine curve, Basel III
JEL Classifications: E58, G18, G28, G30, G32, G38, K20, K22, K23
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The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated
and Systemic Risk Perpetuated
by John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Introduction
A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation,
experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Seas Bubble three hundred
years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse, can legislators and regulators
overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive “reform”
legislation.1 U.S. financial history both confirms and conforms to this broader
generalization. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were
the product of the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression, and their enactment
had to await the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt in 1933. The decisive event
fueling public indignation and shaping these statutes was the Pecora Hearings before the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, which continued from 1932 to 1934.2 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) was enacted, possibly in some haste, in 2002, following the
collapse of Enron in late 2001 and WorldCom in 2002 and an accelerating crescendo of
financial statement restatements by other public corporations.3 Finally, the Dodd-Frank

*

Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School. The author wishes to thank
his colleague Professor Robert Jackson for his assistance.
1
For the view that securities regulation, over the last 300 years, has depended on market crashes
to fuel it, see Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years of Evidence,
75 Wash. U. L. Q. 849 (1997).
2
See Joel Seligman, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A History of the
Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern Corporate Finance (1982) at 1-2, and 39-40.
3
For a description of the increasing rate of financial irregularity and accounting restatements in
this era leading up to the enactment of SOX, see John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?: A
Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269 (2004).
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Act, enacted in 2010,4 followed an even greater financial collapse, one that threatened
financial institutions on a global scale and brought the problem of systemic risk to the
attention of a public already infuriated at financial institutions (and their highly
compensated investment bankers) being bailed out at taxpayer expense. In each of these
episodes, abundant evidence of financial chicanery and fraud was uncovered, and the
public was outraged and revulsed. Not surprisingly, in each of these cases, the
comprehensive reform legislation that followed in the wake of the market collapse
showed hints of the public’s desire for retribution.5 All that is different this time is that
the crisis may be wasted – as hereinafter explained.
Why is it that securities and financial reform legislation seems only to be passed
after a crash or similar crisis? The most plausible answer involves a basic and
foundational theory of political science. Numerous as investors and shareholders are in
the United States, they are dispersed, disorganized, and their potential political power is
diffused. Easily distracted by other important issues, their attention span is also short. In
contrast, the financial services industry is well organized, can keep its focus on the issues
that most affect it, and has an obvious incentive to maintain a powerful lobbying presence
that will give them disproportionate influence. Hence, as any reader of Mancur Olson’s
classic book, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION,6 will recognize, smaller, betterorganized groups are likely to dominate larger, but more diffuse, groups with much
4

The full title of this statute is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). It will be called the Dodd-Frank Act herein.
5
In the case of SOX, this is clearest in the new criminal penalties and enhanced penalties in
Section 902 to 906 of SOX. In the case of Dodd-Frank, Section 748 sets forth elaborate
provisions to protect and subsidize “whistle-blowers” who report misconduct to the SEC. Both
provisions seek to detect and punish miscreants.
6
Mancur Olson, Jr., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1965).
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greater memberships, in seeking to influence either legislation or regulatory policy.7
Olson’s prediction that smaller, but more cohesive, interest groups would predictably
outperform larger citizen-based “latent” groups now seems obvious, but it implies that
groups representing investors or shareholders are likely to be at a severe disadvantage in
competing with well-funded business lobbies.
If so, how is it then that reform legislation ever passes? Later theorists, building
on Olson’s model, have focused on the role of “political entrepreneurs.”8 In crises,
including market crashes, political entrepreneurs gain attention and electoral success,
they argue, by exploiting the popular discontent. Essentially, these entrepreneurs assume
the transaction costs of organizing otherwise latent interest groups in order to secure
7

For later and fuller statements of Olson’s seminal “public choice” perspective, see Russell
Hardin, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) and Todd Sandler, COLLECTIVE ACTION: Theory
and Applications (1992). For a specific application of Olson’s ideas to the world of corporate
governance, see Robert A Prentice and David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate
Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom, 95 Geo. L. J. 1843, 1847-49 (2007).
8
The “political entrepreneur” or “public entrepreneur” is a creative actor, modeled after Joseph
Schumpeter’s economic entrepreneur, who solves the essential dilemma in Mancur Olson’s
theory of collective action: namely, that individuals would rationally prefer to free ride on the
efforts of others. Olson was extremely pessimistic about the ability of large groups to take
meaningful action. Later theorists explain reform legislation as the product of “public
entrepreneurs” seeking “political profit” in the form of votes or election to office. By
manipulating incentives and rewarding their coalition partners, these actors motivate otherwise
passive “latent groups.” See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990);
Richard B. Wagner, “Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article,” PUBLIC
CHOICE (1966); Stephen Kuhnert, An Evolutionary Theory of Collective Action:
Schumpetarian Entrepreneurship for the Common Good, 12 Constitutional Political Economy 1329 (2001). To summarize, from the perspective of political science, the “public entrepreneur” is
the dynamic actor who makes possible collective action in the common interest by bearing the
transaction costs that group members will not bear. Some political figures do appear to have
played such an entrepreneurial role after both the Enron/WorldCom scandals of 2001-2002 and
the 2008 financial crisis. The most obvious nominees for such a role in this author’s judgment
would be Eliot Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo, who each moved from New York Attorney General
to New York Governor after achieving broad recognition for actively challenging misconduct and
conflicts of interest on Wall Street. It is unclear whether any figure, since SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt, has played a corresponding role in the national government.
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election (or re-election) by assisting the public to overcome entrenched business
interests.9
For many, this is precisely how republican government ought to function: leaders
arise to aggregate the discontent and frustrations of citizens. But to a vocal school of
conservative critics of securities regulation, such democratic eruptions are dismaying,
dangerous, and need to be discouraged. The most outspoken and doctrinaire of these
critics is undoubtedly Yale Law School Professor Roberta Romano. In a well-known
article, she condemned SOX for imposing “quack corporate governance” on the United
States.10 Her thesis is, narrowly, that SOX’s key provisions on corporate governance
were not supported by the then available empirical academic literature and, more
generally, that when Congress acts in the wake of a financial crisis, it will predictably
adopt hasty, ill-conceived legislation. Thus, she proposes, among other restrictions, that
all Congressional legislation regulating the securities markets or corporate governance
come with a mandatory sunset provision under which the legislation would expire within
a relative brief period thereafter, unless it was re-adopted by a subsequent Congress.11
9

See Hardin, supra n. 7, at 35-37 (explaining role of political entrepreneurs who market ideas and
aggregate support from latent groups). Anthony Downs argues persuasively that only during
periods of intense public pressure for change, can legislative inertia and interest group veto power
be overcome and reform legislation passed. See Anthony Downs, Up and Down with Ecology –
“The Issue-Attention Cycle”, 28 Pub. Int. 38 (1972). The passage of environmental laws has
followed this same cycle in the view of several commentators. See Christopher H. Schroeder,
Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment – Explanations for Environmental Laws, 1969-1973,
9 Duke Envtl. L & Pol’y F. 29, 33-56 (1998).
10
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance,
114 Yale L. J. 1521 (2005).
11
Id. at 1600 to 1602. Professor Romano is also highly critical of the role of “policy
entrepreneurs” in the passage of SOX. Id. at 1568 to 1569. However, she does not use this term in
any defined or theoretical sense, but simply levies ad hoc criticisms at a variety of officials (some
elected and some administrative officials), most notably Senator Sarbanes. Id. at 1584. Indeed,
the “policy entrepreneurs” she most frequently criticizes are SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and
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Any such reform, of course, would ignore Mancur Olson’s critical insight: the
majority will likely be dominated over the longer term by smaller, but better-motivated,
interest groups. Thus, crisis breeds an opportunity to overcome legislative inertia. From
this starting point, it follows that the consequence of a mandatory sunset rule is to protect
the hegemony of well-financed and better-organized interest groups from majoritarian
attack. After the financial crisis passes and some semblance of “normalcy” returns,
potential political entrepreneurs will be less willing to take on a coalition of wellfinanced, tightly organized business interest groups, because they would know that the
dispersed investor community could not maintain its zeal for long. Financial industry
lobbyists could then easily organize to prevent the re-enactment of the original
legislation, once it reached its moment of sunset. As a result, passage of significant
legislation would mark only the midpoint of the political battle, which would become
more protracted and costly, extending to the end of the sunset period and potentially
chilling aggressive administrative implementation during the interim.
Under the original Romano proposal, reform legislation would automatically
lapse unless (1) the impact of these provisions were first studied and approved by the
SEC, and (2) Congress then re-enacted these provisions, based on the SEC’s

SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner. Id. at 1549 to 1550. Neither were politicians who held (or
had sought) elective office, and hence they did not stand to gain from political activism. Thus,
they would not satisfy the definition of public entrepreneurs used in much of the political science
literature as one seeking political profit. See supra note 8. Rather, these persons come closer to
being technocrats (although on the highest level). Thus, Professor Romano’s critique of the
individuals most involved in the enactment of SOX never integrates with any broader theory, and
she never discusses Mancur Olson or other political science theorists. Her article seems generally
unaware of the political science literature and focuses exclusively on empirical economics.
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endorsement, within a few years thereafter.12 More recently, she has refined her
procedures, but still insisted on a mandatory sunset after five to six years, not just for
securities laws, but for all “foundational financial legislation.”13 Thus, under her
approach, not only the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
would have expired by the end of the 1930s, but similarly the Glass-Steagall Act or
legislation regulating the capital adequacy and risk management polices of banks and
other financial institutions would also self-destruct, unless spared by Congress. Such an
outcome seems sensible only if one believes (as she may) that markets need little
regulation (and thus that regulatory interventions should be short-lived, disappearing like
snowflakes in the sun).
Nonetheless, Professor Romano has her loyal allies.14 Together, they comprise
what might be called the “Tea Party Caucus” of corporate and securities law professors,15

12

Id. at 1601. Even with SEC endorsement, she contemplates that Congress would still have to
re-enact the statute.
13
See Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, Yale Law School Working Paper (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974148) (December 18, 2011). Under her revised proposal, the sunset
would take effect in five to six years. Id. at 15.
14
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY:
UNDERSTANDING HOW SARBANES-OXLEY AFFECTS YOUR BUSINESS (2006); Henry
N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE
LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT (2006); Stephen N. Bainbridge, Sarbanes-Oxley: Legislating in
Haste, Repenting in Leisure, 2 Corp. Governance L. Rev. 69 (2006); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox:
The Road to Nirvana, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 279 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40
Hous. L. Rev. 77 (2003-2004); Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley:
Raising the Rent on U.S. Law, 3 J. Corp. L. Stud. 299 (2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Markets v.
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J.
Corp. L. (2002-2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three Years, 2005 N.Z.L. Rev.
365 (2005).
Although these authors do not tire of criticizing SOX, they have not convinced others.
Reviewing the same economic evidence, Professor John C. Coates finds it harder to balance the
costs and benefits of SOX and generally takes a more balanced position. John C. Coates, The
Goals and Promises of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. Econ. Perspectives 91 (2007). Viewing
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and their key themes are: (1) Congress should not legislate after a market crash, because
the result will be a “Bubble Law” that crudely overregulates,16 (2) state laws are superior
to federal law in regulating corporate governance, because the states are restrained by the
competitive pressure of the market for corporate charters; and (3) federal securities law
should limit itself to disclosure (at most) and not attempt substantive regulation of
corporate governance.17 The underlying theory here comes very close to asserting that

SOX in a less economic light, Professor Donald Langevoort sees SOX as reflecting a shift by
Congress from an exclusively contractarian perspective to a more trust-based conception of the
corporation. See Donald Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 Mich. L.
Rev. 1817, 1828-1833 (2007).
15
While there is irony in this term, it is also intended to be accurate; the three occupy a polar
position at one end of the continuum in terms of their unbroken skepticism and rejection of
governmental regulation. At the same time, as I am happy to recognize, all three are original and
creative legal scholars.
16
Both Professors Bainbridge and Ribstein regularly use the term “Bubble Law” to refer to
federal legislation adopted in the wake of a crash that tends to displace state corporate law. See
Ribstein, Bubble Laws, supra note 14, and Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Corporate
Governance Round II, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1779 (2011).
17
Professor Romano has argued that the federal securities laws had historically avoided
substantive regulation of corporate behavior, staying safely “within a disclosure regime.” See
Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 229, 231
(2009). The distinctive failure of SOX in her view “is its break with the historic federal regulatory
approach of requiring disclosure and leaving substantive governance rules to the states’
corporation codes.” Id. at 232. This is a dubious historical generalization. Although the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 do utilize disclosure as their preferred tool,
the federal securities laws have frequently regulated substantive corporate conduct and
governance. The most controversial federal securities statute of the 1930s was the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, which imposed a “death sentence” on public utility pyramids and
holding company structures – clearly an example of aggressive substantive regulation. See J.
Seligman, supra note 2, at 122-23 (describing the Public Utility Holding Company Act as “the
most radical reform measure of the Roosevelt Administration”). Similarly, the Investment
Company Act of 1940 regulates the board structure of investment companies; initially, it required
a minimum 40% of each investment company’s board be composed of disinterested directors (Id.
at 228-229), and it also compels them to hold a diversified portfolio and not sell securities “short”
– again substantive regulation. More recently, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act required stronger
internal controls over financial reporting (as Professor Romano acknowledges). See Romano,
supra, at 231. Thus, SOX was only a break with an imagined past in which the federal securities
laws exclusively required disclosure.
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democracy is bad for corporate efficiency, and thus legislative inertia should be
encouraged.
This article is not a response to Professor Romano’s sunset proposal. That idea is
unlikely to gain any serious traction outside of the small community of free market and
libertarian theorists who believe financial markets are naturally self-regulating. But this
article is a response to the world view favored by these scholars and an attempt to focus
attention on the critical implementation stage at which reform legislation is regularly
frustrated. Here, it must be acknowledged that the Tea Party Caucus is having an impact,
particularly as they shift their focus from SOX to the Dodd-Frank Act where the stakes
are higher. With the same fervor that they once attacked SOX, they are now seeking the
dismantling of the Dodd-Frank Act, which they also view as having imposed “quack
corporate governance” on the financial markets.18
In response, this article will argue that their shared thesis is unsound for at least
three reasons: (1) unhappy as they may be with democratic majorities, they have no
coherent theory that explains why democratic majorities should be constrained in their

18

See Stephen Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Corporate Governance Round II, 95 Minn. L.
Rev. 1779 (2011). Like Professor Romano, Professor Bainbridge is also suspicious of “suspect
policy entrepreneurs” who were in his view seeking “to advance a long-standing political
agenda.” Id. at 1816. For him, the “suspects” are activists within the “institutional community,
especially union and state and local pension funds.” Id. Citing Professor Romano, he speculates
that these activists are seeking to “reap private benefits not shared with other investors.” Id.
Although this could conceivably be true in some instances, he provides little, if any, evidence and
wholly ignores the even greater possibility that the business interests resisting “reform” are also
seeking to gain (or protect) private benefits of their own. For example, corporate executives
opposed to “say on pay” or other compensation reforms have a clearer self-interest and more
evident desire for private benefits than do the public pension funds who favor “say on pay.”
Professor Romano has also made clear that she views the Dodd-Frank Act as being as
defective as SOX. See Romano, supra note 13, at 9-11.
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ability to act after a crisis;19 (2) they fail to understand the ease with which legislative
mistakes or misjudgments can be corrected in the process of administrative
implementation;20 and (3) even if it is conceded that legislative misjudgments are often
made, their proposed reforms (most notably the mandatory sunset provision) are an
unnecessary “fifth wheel,” given the ease with which business interest groups can push
back, repealing or downsizing legislation whenever they can make a colorable case that
the legislation’s costs exceed its benefits. Although Professor Romano argues that it
would “take a Herculean effort to repeal [SOX’s reforms] given the organization of
government,”21 one has to wear blinders to make this statement. The downsizing of SOX,
as later detailed, began quickly after its passage in 2002 and continues to date. Legislative
efforts to repeal or downsize much of the Dodd-Frank Act are already well-advanced.22
Professor Romano and her allies thus miss exactly what a Mancur Olson would have
predicted: once the crisis subsides, more organized interests groups regain the upper
hand and begin to extract concessions, exemptions or outright repeal.

19

Reasonable people can, of course, disagree about the costs and benefits of most statutes. But
the claim made by Professor Romano and her allies is that post-crash legislation almost invariably
fails. This is a heroic claim that must also factor into its calculus the costs of crashes in underregulated markets. Professor Romano’s distinctive claim is that “policy entrepreneurs”
incorporate their pre-conceived policy agendas into hasty legislation. Ultimately, everyone has
pre-conceived ideas to which they turn in a crisis, and, as later discussed, the core ideas
underlying SOX came from the administrative agency with the most information and experience
in the field (i.e., the SEC), not from some idiosyncratic lone Congressman.
20
See text and notes infra at notes 47 to 48 (discussing exemptive authority possessed by
Securities and Exchange Commission under the federal securities laws). Professor Romano at no
point discusses this authority, which permits the SEC to escape overly burdensome regulation
without the need for legislative action. Perhaps, she believes the SEC is “captured” by liberal
“policy entrepreneurs,” but her silence on this point is revealing.
21
See Romano, supra note 13, at 6-7.
22
See text and notes infra at notes 174 to 180.
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Interestingly, the erosion of SOX has had almost nothing to do with the
weaknesses diagnosed by Professor Romano – i.e., the haste surrounding its passage or
the asserted lack of empirical evidence supporting its reforms. Rather, what has most
motivated the opposition to SOX was the high costs of the requirement in SOX Section
404 for tighter internal controls on financial reporting.23 Yet, these costs resulted not
from the legislation, itself, but from unanticipated, post-enactment administrative
action.24 Those costs have already been reduced by administrative and legislative action,
but the business community remains unsatisfied and senses that complete victory is
obtainable (and without any mandatory sunset legislation).25 Given their relative success,
this episode hardly evidences the need for sunset provisions, as the business community
seems more than capable of protecting its own interests.
Similarly, as the opposition to the Dodd-Frank Act mounts, this counterreaction is
being driven by attempts to protect executive compensation, high leverage, bank
profitability, and managerial discretion – each of which has powerful champions. In
contrast, the goal of curbing systemic risk has no obvious political champion among the
usual participants in the political process of financial regulation.26 Given the resulting

23

See 15 U.S.C. § 7262. For a more detailed discussion of this provision, see text and notes infra
at notes 59 to 67.
24
As later discussed, the high costs of Section 404 came not from any provision of the statute, but
from action taken by a self-regulatory body (the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(“PCAOB”)), which required that the auditors conduct a full-scale audit before attesting under
Section 404(b) to management’s evaluation of its internal controls. See text and notes infra at 59
to 66. SOX’s Section 404 imposed only the requirement that the auditor “attest to management
evaluation.” This is hardly evidence of legislative haste or of a populist eruption. A cynic might
well attribute the high costs of a Section 404 audit to either a desire on the part of the
accountants’ self-regulator to benefit accountants with high fees or to the limited competition
within the highly concentrated accounting industry.
25
See text and notes infra at notes 69 to 71 and notes 174 to 180.
26
See text and notes infra at notes 37 to 38.
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imbalance, Mancur Olson’s model predicts the likely outcome: interest group politics
will produce major revisions to the Dodd-Frank Act, both in the administrative and
legislative processes.
Although SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act share many similarities, two major
differences between them stand out and suggest that the Dodd-Frank Act is even more
vulnerable: First, the Dodd-Frank Act has a much narrower focus than SOX and intends
reforms that could prove much more costly to financial institutions than anything in SOX.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act also makes some attempts to regulate corporate
governance at public corporations, it concentrates to a much greater extent on the
problem of systemic risk at large (“too big to fail”) financial institutions. Unfortunately,
systemic risk is a complex and relatively opaque concept which the average citizen does
not understand or easily identify with. Second, the Dodd-Frank Act depends upon
administrative implementation to a far greater degree than did SOX because Congress
simply could not specify in detail all the proper steps that needed to be taken with respect
to capital adequacy, liquidity ratios, OTC derivatives, and similar complex financial
issues applicable mainly to large financial institutions. For both reasons, the Dodd-Frank
Act is particularly exposed to what may happen in the post-euphoric period after the
legislation passes when public’s attention turns elsewhere and business interest groups
reestablish their usual dominance over the technical process of policy implementation.
If one believes that systemic risk is a serious problem that needs to be addressed
rigorously, this vulnerability is disquieting because, as later described, SOX was
effectively downsized in the period after its passage – by subsequent legislation,
equivocal agency rule-making, judicial hostility, and timid underenforcement by
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regulators. That pattern may well repeat – with the result that adequate protections
against systemic risk will not be implemented. This claim does not rest on any premise
that regulatory agencies have actually been “captured” by the financial industry,27 but
that industry may gain influence at the administrative implementation stage and may
force regulators to trim their sails. Not only does the administrative stage inherently have
lower visibility and is at least as susceptible to lobbying pressure (because of the
influence of the “revolving door” on bureaucratic staffers who expect eventually to return
to the financial industry28), but industry efforts at this later, more pedestrian stage are less
likely to attract challenges from political entrepreneurs who appear in crises to champion
the cause of investors.
A roadmap of this article is now in order. Part I of this article present a model of
how financial reform legislation is frustrated and downsized. This model does not depend
on “industry capture,”29 but rather applies the insights of Mancur Olson (and others) to
the real world of lobbying and administrative implementation. Part I will also contrast
this model with that offered by Professor Romano and her allies. Next, on the premise
that what is past is prologue, Part II of this article will examine how SOX’s provisions
were weakened, abandoned, or downsized at the implementation stage. Such
administrative softening (or even abandonment) of legislative enactments may be even
27

The term “capture” is inherently elusive and suggests that a permanent victory is won by the
industry. In contrast, this article suggests that the opposing sides can each dominate at various
points, but the forces championing public-regarding legislation are only advantaged after a major
crisis.
28
This topic is being increasingly debated in the press. See Andrew Ross Sorkin’s, “The SEC’s
Revolving Door,” New York Times, August 2, 2011 at Dealbook, p. 1.
29
Professor Romano asserts that this author assumes that administrative agencies have been
captured. See Romano, supra note 13, at 18 to 19. No such assumption is made, but some
agencies are very resource constrained and may also be intimidated by a hostile Congress with
control over their budget.
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more likely in the case of the Dodd-Frank Act, because (1) the prospective costs to the
financial industry are higher, (2) the Dodd-Frank Act has no natural allies among the
major political players who usually support “reform” legislation applicable to the
financial markets;30 and (3) the Dodd-Frank Act is even more dependent on
administrative implementation and rule-making. Part III will examine the policy premises
underlying the Dodd-Frank Act. Rather than idealize this legislation, it will acknowledge
that some of its reforms were flawed or even inconsistent. But legislation in the real
world will always be imperfect; this is the necessary consequence of the logrolling and
compromise needed to assemble a majority in a divided political environment. Part IV
will then turn to the implementation of Dodd-Frank and the associated attempts –
legislative and judicial – to downsize it. The evidence to date suggests that a crisis is
being wasted, and thus the danger of future systemic risk catastrophes remains clear and
present. All this will set the stage for a concluding section that will ask (and only partially
answer) the ultimate question: what reforms could work?
Part I. The Regulatory Sine Curve and Statutory Correction
This article’s fundamental premise is that a “Regulatory Sine Curve” governs the
intensity of the oversight exercised by financial regulators. By this phrase, it is meant
both that (1) regulatory intensity is never constant, but rather increases after a market
crash, and then wanes as (and to the extent that) society and the market return to
normalcy, and (2) the public’s passion for reform is short-lived and the support it gives to
political entrepreneurs who seek to oppose powerful interest groups on behalf of the
public also wanes after a brief window of opportunity. This same pattern may

30

See text and notes infra at notes 36 to 38.
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characterize other forms of regulation (for example, environmental regulation may wax
and wane also with highly publicized, vivid environmental disasters), but important
differences exist. Financial regulation is inherently opaque, and the public lacks the same
visceral identification with the key values in play. Few in the public care as passionately
about systemic risk as they may care about the environment or civil rights. Thus, the
public’s attention span may be shorter, and the window of opportunity briefer within
which reform legislation can be passed.
The key implication of the Regulatory Sine Curve is not that legislation is futile,
but that erosion of the statute’s commands will predictably begin shortly after its passage.
Core provisions of the legislation will likely remain (just as the core provisions of the
federal securities laws, including those of SOX, remain in place), and sometimes courts
will fill in the gaps in legislation expansively.31 Nonetheless, the greater the legislation’s
reliance on administrative implementation, the greater the erosion that becomes likely, at
least if the legislation conflicts with the industry’s preferences. This perspective posits
both that downsizing and correction is inevitable and that, to a degree, it may often even
be desirable. But the likelihood of such erosion also justifies strong legislative action in
the first instance (and possibly the framing of some key policies in prophylactic terms
that prevent or at least retard their erosion). This perspective fundamentally conflicts with
that of Professor Romano and the Tea Party Caucus, who believe that reform legislation
passed after a crash will always enact foolish “quack cures” and thus should be
31

Certainly, the federal courts aggressively filled in the gaps in the federal securities laws in the
1960s by, among other things, implying private causes of action. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (implying a private cause of action to enforce federal securities laws). That
period of liberal construction of the federal securities laws has now ended, but courts may uphold
or invalidate administrative rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act to the extent they understand
and accept the purpose of the legislation.

-15-

discouraged. For both sides, a common starting point is the recognition that (i) legislation
is often flawed and unrationalized and (ii) SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act have their own
curious, overbroad and inconsistent elements. But this article responds that the likelihood
of legislative errors and misjudgments hardly merits Draconian measures (such as a
sunset provision) because “correction” is both possible through a variety of less drastic
and more feasible means and probably inevitable in light of the Regulatory Sine Curve.
The standard cyclical progression along the Regulatory Sine Curve (from intense
to lax enforcement) is driven by a basic asymmetry between the power, resources and
organization of the latent group (i.e., investors) and the interest groups affected by the
specific legislation. Cohesion among investors begins to break down once “normalcy”
returns. Professor Romano has disputed this view of investors as a dispersed latent
group,32 chiefly for two reasons: (1) investors, she argues, are effectively represented in
the typical legislative battles over financial regulation by powerful champions, most
notably, in her view, “well-funded and politically influential labor unions, public pension
funds, and the plaintiff’s bar”33; and (2) business is not “monolithic” but has often
conflicting interests.34
Both claims are easily refuted. Most recent studies have found that business
groups dominate the lobbying process.35 Thus, to consider public pension funds a

32

She acknowledges that her work never discusses Mancur Olson and related theorists but asserts
that “it would be a mistake to do so.” See Romano, supra note 13, at 20 n. 11.
33
Id. at 21.
34
Id. at 21.
35
Political scientists have assembled a great deal of evidence on this score. As one survey by
them summarizes:
“Whether we measure it by organizations represented, by money spent, by issues
acted on, or participation in rule-making, we see that businesses and trade
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counterweight to major financial institutions is to mistake an ox for a bull. Pension funds,
as fiduciaries for their beneficiaries, do not make political contributions and are thus
relatively impotent as political actors. Labor unions can, of course, lobby and make
political contributions, but their political power has steadily subsided for decades as the
percentage of the U.S. work force that is unionized has declined.36 The plaintiff’s bar
may be active in politics, but its financial resources are also dwarfed by those of the
major financial institutions, and, as a practical matter, both unions and the plaintiff’s bar
largely limit their efforts to the Democratic side of the political aisle (while business
groups contribute heavily to both sides).37
Equally important, these three alleged champions of investors in the political
process often have interests that diverge from those of investors. To the extent that closer
regulation of banks and financial institutions would restrict their ability to increase
associations consistently mobilize at roughly ten times the rate that those forces
that might countervail them do.”
See Dorie Appollonio, Bruce Cain, and Lee Drutman, Access and Lobbying: Looking Beyond
the Corruption Paradigm, 36 Hastings Const. L. Q. 13, 47 (2008). This study further reports data
on lobbying expenditures and finds that 71.7% of such expenditures are made by “business,”
while only 4.2% are made by “labor.” Id. at 50 (Table 2). Examining spending on federal
lobbying, they also find that the “Finance/Insur/RealEst” sector is the single largest spender,
while labor ranks only eighth. Id. at Table 3. Finally, whatever the data shows with regard to the
past, there is new evidence that corporate political and lobbying expenditures have significantly
increased in response to a recent Supreme Court decision holding that the First Amendment
protects certain corporate political contributions. See John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Politics,
Governance and Value Before and After Citizens United, (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975421) (December 22, 2011).
36
Appollonio, Cain and Drutman report that in 2006 the “Finance/Insur/RealEst” lobby expended
$258.9 million, while “labor” expended $66.6 million – a roughly four to one ratio. Id. at 50
(Table 3). Of course, this understates the real disparity because political contributions and
lobbying by labor almost certainly does not concentrate on financial sector issues, but on
traditional labor issues.
37
Apollonio, Cain, and Drutman report data showing that the “Finance/Insur/RealEst” lobby
allocates its expenditures 54% to Republicans and 44% to Democrats, while labor allocates 12%
to Republicans and 87% to Democrats. Id. at Table 3.
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lending or to underwrite subprime mortgages, this is contrary to the natural interests of
unions, who tend to favor easy credit and increased lending. Increased lending, after all,
creates jobs, and job creation is a principal goal of both labor and some civil rights
groups. In short, those seeking to reduce systemic risk have few natural political allies; it
is a cause that unites largely the technocrats.
Professor Romano’s claim that business is not “monolithic” is, of course, correct
to a degree. Often, business interest groups do battle each other. But the interests of the
financial services industry are remarkably well aligned in opposing increased regulation
of their capital structure, leverage, executive compensation and risk management
policies, and they have been vocal in claiming that the Dodd-Frank Act places them at a
competitive disadvantage in an increasingly global marketplace.38 At a minimum, the
business community shares a common desire to resist the encroachment of regulatory
power over their capital, leverage, and compensation decision-making. It is entirely
understandable that they resist, but such regulatory oversight is exactly what the goal of
limiting systemic risk requires.
Professor Romano proceeds directly from her premise that reform legislation is
always flawed to her conclusion that mandatory sunset legislation is necessary. Others

38

Indeed, Professor Romano herself argues that much of the business community is united in
opposition to the Dodd-Frank Act, believing it has “exacerbated the severe economic downturn
that has followed the global financial crisis.” Romano, supra note 13, at 9. For a representative
and revealing statement by the financial services industry that it considers both Dodd-Frank Act
and Basel III a threat to the U.S. economy and international competitiveness, see “Rules Present a
Grave Threat to the Economy,” Targeted News Service, October 3, 2011 (summarizing press
release issued by Financial Services Roundtable, a major trade association for the financial
services industry).

-18-

have pointed out that the mandatory sunset remedy lacks any serious empirical support.39
This seems a curious omission for someone whose primary objection to reform
legislation is that Congress did not wait for empirical research to discover the optimal
remedy.40 Still, in the absence of such research, it is useful to ask two questions: (1)
What would be the likely consequences of a sunset requirement?, and (2) What are the
less drastic alternatives to her proposed sunset rule?
With regard to the first question, the existing imbalance between the resources of
the contending sides in legislative battles over financial regulation would be greatly
compounded by any mandatory sunset remedy. The “reform” side would have to win
twice, including after the crisis subsides. The necessary second legislative affirmation of
the original victory might be denied because of a minority veto (for example, because of
a blocking position on a key committee or a filibuster). It was exactly for this reason that
Justice (then Professor) Breyer in a well-known book on reforming the administrative
process decided that a mandatory sunset law was too Draconian a remedy.41 Further, to
the extent that the recurring battle over financial regulation is between those who want
more regulation and those who want less, a sunset remedy is inherently one-sided

39

See Prentice and Spence, supra note 7, at1855 (noting that Professor Romano “offers no
evidence that laws enacted in a short time frame tend to have more problems than laws enacted
over a longer period” and “no empirical evidence that sunshine laws provide any benefits on
balance”). It seems ironically inconsistent for Professor Romano to criticize Congress for
enacting many of SOX’s provisions without (in her view) adequate empirical support and then for
her to propose a legislative remedy of her own (a mandatory sunset rule) that also has no
empirical support.
40
Although Professor Romano believes there is “long and well established U.S. experience with
sunset legislation,” she concedes that “[t]here is a dearth of research empirically analyzing sunset
reviews,” and the research that does exist is “mostly qualitative.” Romano, supra note 13, at 17 n.
9. In short, her own proposal does not have the empirical foundation that she insisted SOX and
the Dodd-Frank Act should have.
41
See Stephen Breyer, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) at 366-367.
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because it applies only to legislation that imposes new regulation and not to legislation
that repeals existing regulation. In truth, deregulation can equally be achieved in haste,
with the consequence being ill-considered “reforms” that expose financial markets to
catastrophe.42 If her remedy were truly even-handed, it would apply to deregulatory
provisions as well. Either way, the cost of such a remedy is continuing uncertainty and
potential paralysis, as nothing could be assumed to be permanent.43
To disagree with Professor Romano’s reforms, it is not necessary to take the
opposite position to her on all issues. One need not claim that reform legislation is
typically carefully written or well-planned. Rather, this article starts from the view stated
by Bismarck over a century ago, when he compared the framing of legislation to the
making of sausage.44 Political compromises are often unprincipled, odd, and place
together strange bedfellows. Haste (Professor Romano’s obsession) contributes to this

42

A good example of hasty deregulatory legislation would be the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365, which
exempted over-the-counter derivatives, including swaps, from the jurisdiction of both the
Commodities Future Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Act’s wholesale deregulation of swaps in 2000 set the stage for AIG’s collapse in 2008 when it
could not honor the enormous commitments that it had made by means of unregulated credit
default swaps.
43
For example, if, pursuant to such an even-handed sunset, the CFMA had been subjected to an
automatic termination if Congress did not reaffirm it within five years, the institutions writing
credit defaults swaps over this interim might have faced considerable uncertainty that could have
chilled their willingness to enter this field. Even more frightening (to all except the extreme right)
is the idea that the Federal Reserve Board could similarly vanish, if a polarized Congress could
not act within Professor Romano’s proposed deadline.
44
Otto von Bismark (1815-1898), the Chancellor of Imperial Germany, is reputed to have said:
“Laws are like sausages, it is better not to see them being made.” See
www.brainyquote.com/quotes/o/ottovonbis161318.html.
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state of affairs,45 but it is only one of many factors. Indeed, it is not clear that slow and
piecemeal legislative reform is any less flawed.46
Even if haste does produce error (as seems logical), this risk does not imply that
reformers should remain passive after a financial crisis. At worst, they will face an
imperfect choice: act quickly and imperfectly, within a brief window of opportunity, or
face the likelihood that the forces of legislative inertia will regain the upper hand and
prevent any reform. In fact, however, the choice is usually less stark than this. The key
lesson to be learned from reviewing the response to SOX is that the “correction” of
reform legislation is virtually inevitable. In turn, this undercuts the case for legislative
passivity or mandatory sunsets. Those whose oxen are gored will predictably organize to
secure relief. As later described, SOX exemplifies this pattern.
Accordingly, what is the best, most feasible remedy for legislative error and
misjudgment? In this article’s view, it is the remedy that already exists under the federal
securities laws and that Professor Romano never discusses. Under Section 36 of the
45

In fact, courts have noted that SOX was “hastily passed and poorly drafted.” See In re Enron
Corp. Sec. Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8158 at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2004); In re Adelphia
Communications Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10349 at *5 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2005). On the
other hand, other courts have observed that drafting ambiguities arise in all major legislation and
are eventually corrected or clarified. Thus, in SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 2003 WL 22004827
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2003), United States District Judge Jed Rakoff wrote:
“While Sarbanes-Oxley has been criticized in some quarters, there can be no
doubt that it addresses some of the very problems presented by this Company’s
history. . . . As with other major legislation covering significant new territory,
there are provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that will benefit from either clarifying
regulations or from exemptive actions.” Id. at *17 and n. 43.
This article agrees with Judge Rakoff: a corrective process naturally follows comprehensive
legislation (whether it is adopted in haste or more deliberately).
46
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, separating investment banking from commercial
banking in haste in 1932, then repealed it slowly over several decades, culminating with the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Reasonable persons can disagree over which statute was more
flawed.
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (and similar sections in other federal securities laws),
the SEC possesses “general exemptive authority” and can “conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of
persons, securities or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title, or any
rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”47
This is fairly sweeping language that gives broad authority to the administrative agency,
which will have the benefit of greater information and post-enactment experience, to
override Congress.
The advantages of such an administrative exemptive approach begin with the fact
that, under it, delay, stalling tactics, or a minority veto could not overturn a prior
Congressional enactment. Uncertainty is also reduced, as an administrative agency, with
greater experience and objectivity, must be persuaded to act. The agency’s actions are
likely to be both more predictable and more incremental, thus avoiding the uncertain allor-nothing choice inherent in sunset provisions. Only if one believes that the SEC has
been “captured” by some interest group does this more tailored and precise remedy seem
inferior to a gamble on a sunset provision.48
To sum up, the contrast between the Tea Party Caucus’s perspective and that
taken here is basic, but both share some common elements. Under the world as viewed by
Professor Romano and her allies, reform legislation follows “a media clamor for
47

See 15 U.S.C. § 78mm. This provision was added in 1996 by Pub. L. 104-290. Similar
exemptive provisions are set forth in Section 28 (“General Exemptive Authority”) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3, and Section 206A (“Exemptions”) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6a.
48
Because Professor Romano never discusses the option of agency exemptive authority, one
cannot know her criticisms of it (or even if she was aware of these provisions).
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action,”49 and this “media frenzy . . . compels legislators not only to respond, but to
respond quickly, even though they . . . cannot possibly determine what would be the best
policy to adopt in the circumstances.”50 Typically, she argues, they adopt “recycled
proposals fashioned to resolve quite unrelated problems, imagined or real, which policy
entrepreneurs advance as ready-made solutions to immediate concerns, to a Congress in
need of off-the-shelf proposals that can be enacted quickly.”51 Further, because Congress
is risk averse and self-interested, Congress delegates great discretion to administrative
agencies as “a means by which legislators can avoid responsibility for adverse policy
consequences.”52
The alternative view, here presented, agrees that crisis is a precipitant, allowing
legislative inertia to be overcome. After a crisis, Congress tends to adopt proposals that
the relevant administrative agency has long favored, but that were frustrated by powerful
lobbies. Only with a crisis can reformers (or “political entrepreneurs” in the political
science vernacular) aggregate sufficient support to pass reform legislation. For example,
in the years prior to the Enron and WorldCom crisis in 2001-2002, SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt had sought to respond to a soaring number of financial statement restatements and
had campaigned to restrict auditor conflicts of interest.53 But he was rebuffed by the

49

See Romano, supra note 13, at 4.
Id. at 5-6.
51
Id. at 6.
52
Id. at 8.
53
Financial statement restatements at publicly traded companies appear to have risen from 49 in
1996 to an estimated 250 in 2002, or an increase of approximately 270 percent over the five years
ending in 2002. See, John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?: A Capsule Social and Economic
History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 283 (2004).
50
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industry.54 With the Enron and WorldCom’s insolvencies and the evidence of financial
impropriety manifest to all, Levitt and others (most notably, Senator Paul Sarbanes) were
able to convince Congress to replace auditor self-regulation with a new body: the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).55 The PCAOB was the centerpiece
of SOX, but it was hardly an “off-the-shelf” proposal. But for the crisis, auditor selfregulation would have persisted. Depending on which perspective is preferred, Arthur
Levitt and Paul Sarbanes are either the heroes or villains of this story.56
But the story does not end there. “Correction” does follow, both in the form of
administrative rules that soften some legislative commands and in the form of legislation
curbing the prior statute. The next section will describe this process in more detail, as it
applied to SOX, and a later section will turn to the Dodd-Frank Act. Reasonable persons
can disagree about whether this corrective process went too far (as this author tends to
believe) or not far enough. But it is an inevitable part of the Regulatory Sine Curve,
which is next examined in operation.
Part II: SOX Revisited: The Downsizing of Reform
54

Even Professor Romano has recognized that “the provision of nonaudit services by auditors had
been subject to persistent efforts at elimination by the SEC prior to SOX’s prohibition.” See
Romano, supra note 10, at 1534. Thus, the legislative provisions that she most objects to in SOX
did not come from the liberal constituencies of which she is suspicious (unions, public pension
funds, and the plaintiff’s bar), but from the administrative agency with the most experience in the
field. This does not fit her diagnosis that Congress turns in a crisis to the pet ideas of special
interest groups or individual Congressmen, and adopts them without careful evaluation. Similarly,
Professor Bainbridge claims that “suspect policy entrepreneurs” conspire to “hijack the legislative
process to advance a long-standing political agenda.” See Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 1816.
This simply did not happen in the case of SOX, where the principal administrative agency in the
field had clearly detected a decline in the performance of a critical gatekeeper.
55
The PCAOB is established, and its powers specified, in Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. See Sections 101 to 110, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211 to 7220.
56
Professor Romano has made it very clear that she considers both to have been “policy
entrepreneurs” who foisted flawed legislation on the country. See Romano, supra note 10, at
1549-50 and 1584.
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Professor Romano’s article on “Quack Corporate Governance” principally
focused on four areas where, in her view, SOX’s reforms were unsupported by the
empirical academic literature: (1) independent audit committees; (2) the restrictions on
auditors providing nonaudit services to audit clients; (3) executive loans, and (4)
executive certification of financial statements.57 Interestingly, the efforts to revise or
downsize SOX have largely ignored the first three of these areas. In contrast, the fourth
area (the prohibition on executive loans) has been quickly and quietly curtailed as a result
of collective action taken by the private bar (and acquiesced in by the SEC).58 The weight
of academic empirical research appears not to have had much impact either on SOX’s
proponents or its critics. Instead, the business community focused primarily on softening
the requirements imposed by SOX’s Section 404, which required an annual independent
review of a public company’s internal controls that became more costly than most had
anticipated.
This section will focus on those areas where SOX encountered the greatest
resistance or has been the most abandoned: (1) Section 404; (2) executive loans; and (3),
Section 307, which required lawyers representing the corporation to report securities (and
similar) violations up the corporate ladder.
A. Section 404 and Internal Control Reports. Although Section 404 of SOX
became highly controversial in time, it was a “sleeper” provision that attracted
comparatively little attention initially. As passed, it mandated only that the SEC adopt a
new “internal control report” that had to be included in the issuers’ annual report on Form

57
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See Romano, supra note 10, at 1529 to 1542.
See text and notes infra at notes 73 to 82.
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10-K.59 In this report, management had to assess the effectiveness of management’s
internal controls over financial reporting. Then, Section 404(b) required the company’s
outside auditor to “attest to and report on” management’s assessment.60 Such an
attestation requirement was not inherently costly. What made this provision become
costly and controversial was the subsequent decision of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), made two years after SOX’s passage, to require a full scale
audit of the issuer’s internal controls before the auditor might so attest. Under its
Auditing Standard No. 2, adopted in 2004,61 the PCAOB required the auditor to test and
evaluate both the design and operating effectiveness of the issuer’s internal controls
before it could deem itself satisfied with management’s own assessment requirement.
Effectively, this implied that the auditor must conduct two full audits: the first being the
traditional audit of the issuer’s financial statements, and the second being the audit of the
issuer’s internal controls.
This proved expensive and provoked a political reaction. But the decision to
require a full audit was not the product of SOX, itself. The accounting profession largely
welcomed this dual audit requirement, which proved very lucrative for them.
Nonetheless, if auditors were happy with this rule, issuers were not. Almost immediately
59

Section 404(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Management Assessment of Internal Controls”)
required an “annual internal control report” that contained “an assessment , as of the end of the
most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and
procedures of the issuer for financial reporting.” See 15 U.S.C. § 7262. As the caption to the
section states, this Section 404(a) report was to be prepared by the issuer’s management.
60
See 15 U.S.C. § 7262. The last sentence of this Section 404(b) then added that this attestation
“shall be made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued or adopted by the
[Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.]”
61
The PCAOB’s authority to adopt this rule came from Section 404(b). See supra note 60. See
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49884 (June 23, 2004) (“Order Approving Auditing
Standard No. 2, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction
With an Audit of Financial Statements”).
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following the adoption of Auditing Standard No. 2 in 2004, issuers and others began to
call for it to be downsized. In 2006, an SEC Advisory Committee recommended that this
internal controls audit be waived in the case of smaller companies, which it defined as
those with a market capitalization under $125 million.62 Foreign issuers, who began to
delist from U.S. exchanges in significant numbers in the period after 2000, often pointed
to Section 404 as a leading cause of their decision to flee the U.S. markets. Both
successfully delayed the application of Section 404 to them.
Finally, in 2007, the PCAOB relaxed Auditing Standard No. 2 by replacing it with
Auditing Standard No. 5, which softened a number of its requirements.63 An announced
intention of this revision was to reduce audit costs, particularly for smaller companies.64
A follow up SEC study of Section 404 found a significant decrease in audit costs as a
result of the 2007 changes.65
Still, this marginal improvement did not satisfy Congress. The Dodd-Frank Act
continued the downsizing of the internal controls audit by exempting from Section 404(b)
issuers that were neither “accelerated filers” nor “large accelerated filers.”66 Effectively,
this meant that non-accelerated filers (i.e., filers with a market capitalization of $75
million or less) were still required to include management’s evaluation of its internal
62

See Securities Act Release No. 8666 (March 3, 2006) (“Exposure Draft of the Advisory
Committee on Smaller Public Companies”).
63
See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-56152 (July 27, 2007) (“Order Approving
Proposed Auditing Standard No. 5: An Audit of Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting That
Is Integrated With An Audit of Financial Statement”).
64
The SEC emphasized this likely cost reduction in approving Auditing Standard No. 5. Id. at 18
(noting that most commentators on proposed Auditing Standard No. 5 believed it would reduce
the costs of compliance with Section 404).
65
See Securities and Exchange Commission, Study on Section 404 (April 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/404float-study.pdf.
66
See Section 989G of the Dodd-Frank Act (adding new Section 404(c) to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002).
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controls in their Annual Report on Form 10-K, but they no longer had to include their
auditor’s attestation to that report (which would have required an audit under the
PCAOB’s rules).67 The SEC further accommodated newer issuers by delaying Section
404’s internal control attestations until a public company was required to file its second
Form 10-K, thereby effectively giving a company two years after its IPO before such a
report was due.68
Even the Dodd-Frank Act’s partial repeal of Section 404 has not ended the push
for still greater downsizing. In late 2011, the Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, a
White House-created advisory body, issued a report calling for the massive downsizing
of SOX’s requirements with respect to public companies having a market capitalization
below $1 billion.69 Section 404 seems to be the primary target (but hardly the exclusive
one). The proposed $1 billion market capitalization cutoff would exempt roughly twothirds of the roughly 5,700 public companies listed on major U.S. stock exchanges.70 This
proposal has already elicited a sharp editorial rebuke from the New York Times,71 but the
proposal does appear to have bipartisan support.

67

See Securities Act Release No. 33-9142 (Sept. 15, 2010) (adopting new rules in response to
Section 989G of Dodd-Frank Act).
68
See Item 308 and Item 308T of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.308 and 308T. These
provisions permit newly public companies to delay until their second annual report on Form 10-K
the filing of management’s assessment (and the accompanying auditor’s attestation) of internal
controls over financial reporting.
69
David Milstead, “A Desperate Obama Kicks Investor Protection to the Curb; in a bid to create
jobs the U.S. President appears willing to gut measures that defend shareholders,” The Globe and
Mail, October 18, 2011 at p. B19.
70
Id.
71
See “Not Their Job,” New York Times, October 20, 2011 at p. 28. Pending legislation would
exempt “emerging growth companies,” which are defined as companies with less than $1 billion
in gross revenues and $700 million in public float, from Section 404(b). See text and notes infra
at notes 174 to 180.
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Reasonable persons can debate the wisdom of the PCAOB’s various actions (both
in requiring an audit of internal controls and then in sparing from that audit smaller
issuers, who are actually more likely to experience internal control problems).72 But three
conclusions seem justified: (1) “Hasty” Congressional action did not cause the Section
404 crisis (rather more deliberate action by a politically neutral, self-regulatory
organization did); (2) A corrective process curbed much of the perceived problem within
a few years of SOX’s passage (and may yet sweep away still more of SOX’s provisions);
and (3) Even Section 404 will not be nullified, as the maximum proposed retrenchment
would still leave the internal controls audit in place for larger companies with a market
capitalization over $1 billion. Again, whether this corrective process went too far or not
far enough can be debated, but it exemplifies the Regulatory Sine Curve in operation.
Dodd-Frank is likely to receive similar treatment.
B. Executive Loans and Section 402. Section 402 of SOX is distinctive. Unlike
other provisions of SOX (or the Dodd-Frank Act) that authorize agency rule-making,
Section 402 baldly prohibited public companies from arranging or extending credit to
their executive officers or directors.73 Adopted with little discussion and late in the
process of drafting SOX,74 it did not address such obvious issues as travel advances,
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For evidence in support of a strong internal controls audit requirement, see Robert Prentice,
Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 703
(2007). This issue is not, however, the focus of this article.
73
Section 402 has been codified as Section 13(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“Prohibition on Personal Loans to Executives”). See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k). The language of
Section 13(k) is broad, because it precludes the issuer not only “to extend or maintain credit,” but
also “to arrange for the extension of credit, or to renew any extension of credit.” See Section
13(k)(1).
74
As Professor Romano notes, Section 402 “was introduced at the end of the legislative process
in the Senate as a floor amendment substitute for a provision” that was initially drafted “as a
disclosure measure.” Romano, supra note 10, at 1538.
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relocation and retention loans, and broker-assisted cashless stock option exercises. Thus,
Section 402 provides some support for the Romano critique that post-crash reform
legislation can be overbroad and can disrupt legitimate business practices and objectives.
What she ignores, however, is that it did not last long.
Despite Professor Romano’s views that executive loans were a matter of “settled
state law” and had not generated “scholarly controversy,”75 the empirical evidence
actually seems to indicate that such loans resulted in stealth compensation and were
associated with both higher rates of financial misstatement and lower industry-adjusted
returns.76 Further, although Professor Romano defends executive loans as leading to
greater stock ownership and thus a better alignment of interests between corporate
management and shareholders, several studies question this linkage (partly because the
stock so acquired could be immediately sold) and in any event find that such loans may
have induced managers to pursue high-risk corporate investment policies.77
Of course, what moved Congress in adopting SOX was not the empirical studies
or the economic arguments, but the anecdotal evidence of extreme abuse: Bernie Ebbers,
CEO of WorldCom, borrowed $408 million from his company (and could ultimately
repay none of it); Ken Lay, CEO of Enron, received $70 million in loans from Enron (as
75

Id. at 1538.
This evidence is concisely summarized by Professors Prentice and Spence. See Prentice and
Spense, supra note 7, 1894 to 1895. See also, Kathleen M. Kahle & Kuldeep Shastri, Executive
Loans, 39 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 791, 794-95 (2004); Charles Cullinan et al., A Test of
the Loan Prohibition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Are Firms that Grant Loans to Executives More
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“significant association between executive loans and financial misstatements”); Elizabeth A.
Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions: Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm
Value at 6 (EFA 2004 Maastricht Meeting, Paper No. 4377) (2004) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=55893) (finding “strong negative relationship between industry-adjusted
returns and . . . loans” to executives).
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opposed to only $67 million in compensation); and Dennis Kozlowski, CEO of Tyco,
borrowed approximately $270 million (which he largely used to purchase personal assets
and real estate, rather than stock).78 As of the time that Congress enacted SOX in 2002,
the average cash loan disclosed by those public companies that disclosed loans to
executives was $11 million, and the total insider indebtedness for such companies was
$4.5 billion.79 Worse yet, many of these executive loans were secured by only the stock
itself; thus, if the stock price dropped, the board faced the choice of lending additional
amounts to the executives or watching them sell their stock and drive down the
company’s stock price.80
The bottom line then is that Congress had legitimate justifications for seeking to
curb executive loans, but arguably did so clumsily and in an overbroad fashion. What
happened next? The real surprise in the aftermath to Section 402 is that the SEC did
virtually nothing. Instead, a coalition of some 25 major law firms drafted and publicly
released a memorandum explaining how they would interpret Section 402,81 and the SEC
quietly acquiesced. Many of the positions taken in this memorandum were quite
reasonable, while others were more questionable (and almost certainly would not have
been proposed in an SEC release). More important than the particular positions taken is
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the fact that the bar simply replaced the SEC as the authoritative interpreter of the
statute’s meaning. This example shows the Regulatory Sine Curve on steroids.
Why did the SEC behave so passively? One reason may have been that the
corporate power to make loans to executives is usually governed by state law, and the
SEC may not have felt comfortable invading Delaware’s territory. More likely, however,
is a second explanation: the SEC is a lawyer-dominated agency that does not want to
become involved in a confrontation with the elite law firms of the private bar. Once those
firms had taken a collective position, the confrontation would have been personal and
even bruising if the SEC had rejected their interpretation (on which advice their clients
were presumably relying). Here, we need to take into account the much discussed
“revolving door” phenomenon under which SEC staffers join the Commission for a brief
tour of duty before returning to positions on Wall Street or in the private bar. Given such
career expectations, SEC staffers may be far more anxious about confronting the bar than
any other interest group.
Still, the result was that the SEC allowed the bar to dictate the interpretation of a
statutory provision in a manner that closely circumscribed what Congress had broadly, if
clumsily, forbidden. The result was that a legislative “Thou Shall Not” was converted
into a much weaker administrative “Thou generally should not . . .” Interestingly, in the
time since the 25 law firm memorandum was adopted, the SEC has – with one exception
– never brought an enforcement proceeding to contest an executive loan.82 One suspects
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that the opportunities were there for enforcement actions if the SEC had been willing to
pursue them.
C. Attorneys As Whistle Blowers and Section 307. Section 307 of SOX
instructed the SEC to adopt minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of public
companies. This provision was adopted with considerable fanfare by Senators who noted
that lawyers were always “present at the scene of the crime” when securities frauds
occurred.83 The Commission responded by adopting its “Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the
Representation of an Issuer” with even greater fanfare in 2003.84 Under it, attorneys have
an obligation to report material violations of federal or state securities laws, or breaches
of fiduciary duty, to the issuer’s chief legal officer or to its chief executive officer.85 If the

approval) plus the fact that the officers acknowledged their awareness of SOX’s prohibition on
executive loans (but did not consult counsel) may explain why the SEC made an exception and
sued in this case and not in others (at least to date).
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issuer still fails to take action, the lawyer may be required to report further to the
company’s audit committee.86 Under some limited circumstances, the lawyer is even
permitted (but not required) to disclose a material violation of law directly to the SEC.87
Aspirational as SEC Standards of Professional Conduct are, they have been
followed by total silence on the enforcement front. Despite numerous instances in which
lawyers were clearly aware of executive misconduct – and both the stock option
backdating scandal and the mutual fund market timing scandal followed the adoption of
these standards and presented instances in which attorneys were deeply implicated in
misconduct involving violations of the federal securities laws – the SEC appears never to
have charged an attorney representing a public corporation with violating this rule. To be
sure, lawyers have been indicted for securities fraud and insider trading and civilly sued
by the SEC, but these cases usually involve egregious self-dealing. The lesser remedy of
asserting a professional conduct violation has simply not been used by the SEC.
Why not? Sanctioning attorneys for failure to report violations up the ladder
within the corporate structure would again place the SEC in a position of high conflict
with the bar. In contrast to prosecutions of attorneys for insider trading or other scienterbased offenses, the SEC’s enforcement of reporting rules would reach attorneys who
acted only negligently and or who declined to act (without in either case any clear
element of self-dealing).

“becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by the issuer or by any officer, director,
employee or agent of the issuer” to “report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer . . .
forthwith.” 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b).
86
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3).
87
See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2).
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The SEC has long (and perhaps unwisely) resisted entering this zone, based on the
overbroad rationale that to discipline attorneys for negligence or inaction would chill the
attorney/client relationship and might dissuade clients from seeking legal advice.88 A
recent case exemplifies the SEC’s continuing reluctance to engage in non-scienter based
enforcement actions against attorneys. In In the Matter of Scott G. Monson,89 the SEC’s
staff brought a cease and desist proceeding against a general counsel of a publicly held
broker-dealer, who had allegedly facilitated late trading by that broker-dealer on behalf of
its clients in over 600 mutual funds in violation of a very explicit and well-known
Investment Company Act rule.90 The attorney had drafted an agreement pursuant to
which the broker-dealer’s clients were authorized to engage in “late trading,” but the
SEC’s staff did not allege that the attorney either knew that late trading violated the
securities laws or that late trading was occurring. Noting that it had long avoided bringing
cases against an attorney on the theory that the attorney “departed from professional
standards of competence in rendering private legal advice to their clients,”91 the
Commission explained that such restraint was necessary to avoid “encroachment by the
88
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Commission on regulation of private attorney conduct historically performed by the
states; interference with lawyers’ ability to provide unbiased, independent legal advice
regarding the securities laws, and chilled advocacy on behalf of clients in proceedings
before the Commission.”92 On this basis, the Commission therefore affirmed dismissal of
the Enforcement Division’s complaint.
Arguably, these concerns are overblown when applied to an attorney who drafts
an agreement expressly authorizing clearly unlawful conduct. Late trading is not a gray
offense. More importantly, such an explanation – that the Commission will not normally
proceed against professionals absent evidence of scienter – virtually implies that the
Commission will not seriously enforce Section 307. Thus, it should not be surprising that
Section 307 seems to have been abandoned by the Commission. As with its refusal to
enforce the executive loan prohibition, the Commission seems unwilling to enter areas
where it might either infringe on state regulation or encounter resistance from the bar.
The consequence is that clear Congressional pronouncements are watered down or
abandoned, and the rationale is basically the same rationale advocated by critics such as
Professors Romano and Bainbridge: namely, that federal agencies should not “encroach”
upon areas traditionally relegated to state regulation.
Possibly, this explanation for equivocal SEC enforcement in the case of the
financial industry is too narrow. Some federal courts have expressed concern that the
SEC is too easily satisfied with symbolic, but hollow, victories and too apprehensive
about the prospect of a litigation defeat in truly contested litigation to take on a major
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opponent. That was the thrust of Judge Rakoff’s recent Bank of America decision.93 For
present purposes, it is not necessary to select the best explanation to reach the conclusion
that equivocal enforcement by the SEC in cases involving major players in the financial
industry has long been the pattern, and that pattern does not seem likely to change
markedly in the near future.
D. An Evaluation. The Tea Party critics of both SOX and the Dodd-Frank Act
argue that, because “reform” legislation is rushed and hastily framed, the policy
formulation is distorted by “suspect policy entrepreneurs” who “hijack the legislative
process to advance a long-standing political agenda.”94 Brief as this review of SOX has
been, it should make clear that “suspect policy entrepreneurs” did not play a major role in
adopting or expanding SOX’s most controversial provision, Section 404. Nor is the
meaning of “suspect policy entrepreneur” analytically clear or helpful. Many interest
groups attempt to influence legislation and regulation (and business interest groups are
particularly active). Why investor-oriented groups (such as public pension funds) are
“suspect,” while groups favoring the status quo (such as business interest groups) are not
considered equally “suspect” has not been adequately explained by these critics.
As next explained, the same critique has been directed at the Dodd-Frank Act.95
Once again, it has only limited explanatory power. Even if it were the case that investor-
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oriented groups (such as pension funds and unions) are more active politically in the
period following a crash, it remains unclear why their activity is “suspect,” while the far
better funded political activity of business interest groups in seeking to repeal or curtail
such legislation after normalcy returns is not.
Part III. The Dodd-Frank Act: Premises and Policy Options
In 2008, Congress saw the nation’s largest financial institutions race like
lemmings over the cliff and into insolvency. Why did they all become insolvent at once?
Three credible scenarios have been offered by a variety of commentators. Each seems
correct in part, and each motivated the legislative effort that produced the Dodd-Frank
Act:
A. Moral Hazard: “Executive Compensation Caused the Crash.” Because a
rapid shift towards incentive-based compensation at financial institutions focused senior
management on short-term results, longer-term risks were ignored or underweighed.96
For example, if the executives in charge of asset-backed securitizations at a financial
institution could make $100 million in bonuses in a single year if sufficient deals closed
that year, such expected compensation could easily produce a “damn-the-torpedoes,-fullspeed-ahead” approach to risk taking. Indeed, why should such executives worry at all
about the longer-term risks to their bank? Excessive compensation thus led to moral
hazard. Inevitably, such a diagnosis leads to proposals to restrict executive compensation.
But how and by whom? Here, the devil is in the details. Once we descend into the details
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in the implementation process, the special interests and their lobbyists hold all the
advantages.
2. Because Creditors Believed That “Too Big to Fail” (“TBTF”) Banks Would
Always Be Bailed Out, They Advanced Funds Too Cheaply and Allowed Banks to
Become Overleveraged. Economists generally agree that an implicit Governmental
subsidy for TBTF banks arose because the market assumed that such institutions would
be bailed out. Such an implicit guarantee of their solvency leads investors to lend more
cheaply to TBTF banks in comparison to smaller banks.97 The larger the bank, the
cheaper it could borrow, in part because all assumed that the government would not allow
the bank to fail. Seeing this subsidy, the shareholders and managers of such financial
institutions rationally exploited it by taking on excessive debt and leverage. In effect, the
banking system was encouraged to risk a solvency crisis because all market participants
believed that the Government would have to bail it out. From this perspective, the core
evil is the implicit subsidy for TBTF banks through cheaper borrowing costs, and the
obvious economic answer is to tax this externality and cancel this subsidy. But
eliminating subsidies and taxing externalities means making banks less profitable, and
any such program will be predictably fought by the industry at every possible level –
usually with the counterargument that imposing higher costs on TBTF banks will mean
reduced employment and lending.
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3. Bounded Rationality: Cognitive Limitations, Conflicts of Interest, and a Lack
of Transparency Induced Market Participants to Repress Recognition of the Problems
Overtaking The Market. AIG provides the paradigm of this problem.98 By 2008, most
major financial institutions had come to rely, directly or indirectly, on credit default
swaps issued (or backstopped) by AIG to hedge these institutions’ exposure to financial
risks.99 Had AIG’s aggregate contingent liability on credit default swaps been publicly
recognized, many would have recognized that AIG alone could not insure them against
an exposure of this magnitude. Instead, even if the market’s extraordinary dependence on
AIG was dimly perceived, market participants were not forced to admit that the Emperor
had no clothes. Instead, the problem was collectively repressed, which occurred to a
considerable degree because the credit default swap market was itself opaque. Often for
self-interested reasons (again involving executive compensation), financial managers
persisted in maintaining highly vulnerable portfolios and remaining exposed to enormous
risk, relying on an illusory form of insurance.
So what is the appropriate answer to this recurring tendency? If a stubborn refusal
to recognize inconvenient truths is the problem, the obvious policy reform is greater
transparency: require OTC derivatives to be traded over exchanges and through
clearinghouses, and it will be less possible for one actor to assume AIG’s position as the
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counterparty for the entire market. As will be seen, the Dodd-Frank Act moves in this
direction – equivocally and in a manner dependent on still pending implementation.
In response to all these perceived causes of the 2008 crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act
pursued several strategies, broadly delegating authority to administrative agencies to fill
in the details. First, in response to the initial hypothesis that excessive compensation
induced excessive risk-taking, the Dodd-Frank Act adopted two somewhat inconsistent
strategies. On one hand, it sided with traditional corporate governance reformers,
enacting much of their standard agenda: access to the proxy statement, “say on pay”
advisory shareholder votes, and the elimination of broker votes. On the other hand, the
Dodd-Frank Act gave financial regulators a broad paternalistic power to restrict executive
compensation. As will be seen, with the return of “normalcy,” courts have struck down
some of the corporate governance reforms (and others are in jeopardy).100 Meanwhile,
regulators are quietly downsizing the restrictions authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act on
executive compensation.101
With respect to the second diagnosis that the “too big to fail” subsidy for banks
induced the excessive leverage that underlay the 2008 crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act took
elaborate steps to restrict federal lending to large financial institutions, except when they
are being liquidated. The Dodd-Frank Act’s goal was to signal that there would be no
more bailouts, and hence creditors should not lend to TBTF banks on the same
discounted terms. Yet, liquidity crises are endemic to banking, and whether the DoddFrank Act resolves or aggravates the “TBTF problem” is debatable. All that is clear is
100
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that, post-2008, the U.S. banking industry has become even more consolidated (as the
survivors acquired those institutions that failed), and the failure of a TBTF bank would be
even more catastrophic. Perhaps, as many suspect, financial regulators can still outflank
the Dodd-Frank Act’s restrictions and find ways to bail out a failing bank. But, if so, the
implicit subsidy has not been ended and the potential for another systemic risk crisis
remains latent beneath the surface of reform.
Finally, looking at the AIG paradigm, Congress decided to shift the trading of
over-the-counter derivatives to exchanges and require the use of clearinghouses. But
Congress stopped short of deciding how far to push this reform and instead delegated the
issue (subject to some substantial exemptions to financial regulators).
This article does not portray the Dodd-Frank Act as “perfect” legislation. Like
much “reform” legislation, it is a potpourri of different provisions, some of which may be
inconsistent or poorly conceived. That is inevitable in the real world when Congress must
act under time pressure and faces the need to satisfy many constituencies. Thus, this
article focuses more on the incompleteness of the Dodd-Frank Act, the continuing need
for detailed implementation, and the erosive impact of the Regulatory Sine Curve on that
process. It will focus primarily on three areas: (1) executive compensation; (2) the “too
big to fail” problem and proposed reforms to restrain risk-taking by TBTF banks, and (3)
the over-the-counter derivatives area (where the AIG bailout provided the motivating
force for Congress). Although it will agree that the Dodd-Frank Act was in some respects
imperfectly designed, the greater problem is that it relies on administrative
implementation that can be too easily frustrated.
A. Executive Compensation and Shareholder Pressure
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The conventional story of the 2008 crisis—as best told by Professor Lucian
Bebchuk and his coauthors102—focuses on the perverse influences created by executive
compensation formulas. They argue not only that executive pay packages were
excessively focused on short-term results, but that because senior executives’
compensation packages were closely tied to highly levered bets on the value of the banks’
assets, such executives shared in any shareholder gains but were insulated from
shareholder losses.103 Hence, they could focus on the upside and ignore the downside of
any risky strategy. The result, they argue, is a classic moral hazard problem.
To corroborate their claim, Bebchuk and his coauthors have collected data
showing that senior managers appeared to have profited handsomely even when
shareholders lost virtually everything. Examining the failures of Bear Stearns and
Lehman, they find that the top five executives at each firm cashed out extraordinary
amounts of performance-based compensation during the 2000–2008 period. Specifically,
they estimate that these top five management teams derived $1.4 billion and $1 billion,
respectively, from cash bonuses and equity sales during this period.104 These amounts
substantially exceeded the same executives’ stock holdings at the beginning of the period.
If managers win when shareholders lose, this finding would seem to confirm Bebchuk’s
moral hazard diagnosis.
Their research has not, however, gone unchallenged. In particular, Rene Stulz has
coauthored several papers that dispute this thesis that the executive compensation
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formulas for senior executives at financial institutions drove the 2008 crisis by creating
an incentive to accept excessive risk.105 In one paper, he and a coauthor find evidence
that those banks with chief executive officers (CEOs) whose incentives were better
aligned with their shareholders actually performed worse during the crisis.106 They
suggest that “CEOs with better incentives to maximize shareholder wealth took risks that
other CEOs did not.”107 Nor do they find that bank CEOs reduced their stock holdings
prior to 2008; hence, they suffered large wealth losses along with the shareholders.108 In
short, little evidence supports the claim that shareholders were being overreached by their
CEOs.
In another study, Stulz and a coauthor find that banks with “shareholder-friendly”
corporate governance performed worse during the 2008 crisis.109 Indeed, banks that the
market had favored in 2006 had especially poor returns during the crisis.110 In other
words, financial institutions that led the market in 2006 encountered disaster in 2008. In
contrast, financial institutions that had seemed stodgy and unresponsive to shareholder
105
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desires in 2006 experienced the least losses in 2008. Such findings are at least consistent
with the view that shareholder pressure led managers to take on higher leverage and
accept greater risk in the boom years—with catastrophic consequences later in 2008.
Shareholders in effect opted for a financial roller coaster, and the firms they controlled
soared to record peaks and plunged to deep valleys in rapid succession.
Other studies by different teams of researchers have reached similar conclusions.
Gropp and Köhler find that “owner controlled” banks had higher profits in the years
before the 2008 crisis in comparison to “manager controlled” banks, but experienced
larger losses and were more likely to require governmental assistance during the 2008
crisis.111 Using a sample of 296 firms from thirty countries, Erkens, Hung, and Matos
show that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership
experienced worse stock returns during the 2007–2008 crisis.112 Specifically, they found
that firms with higher institutional ownership took “greater risk in their investment
policies before the onset of the crisis.”113 Such evidence suggests that even if managers
would prefer to avoid high risk and leverage, their preferences can be overridden by
shareholders, and that institutional investors in particular can compel firms to accept
greater risk and thus cause them to suffer worse losses in a crisis.
The point here is not that Professor Bebchuk and his coauthors are wrong. They
argue that the pay formulas used to compensate senior management at banks gave them
111
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an excessive incentive to accept risk. But such an increased incentive could be exactly
what shareholders wanted. Shareholders have long used executive compensation to align
managerial preferences with their own, and institutional investors certainly understand
that managers are undiversified and thus risk averse about corporate insolvency. Being
diversified and having limited liability, shareholders do not suffer as much as managers
from a bankruptcy. To “correct” the managerial tendency toward risk aversion,
shareholders might have been willing to accept even imperfect compensation formulas to
seduce managers into accepting increased risk. Thus, both sides in this debate could have
valid points. Bebchuk and company appear correct in arguing that compensation
formulas create excessive incentives for bank managers to engage in risky activities, and
Stulz and others can legitimately interpret their own data to mean that shareholdercontrolled firms accept higher risk and hence are more prone to failure in a crisis than
firms in which managers are free to enjoy the quiet life (and so avoid risk). Rather than
managers overreaching shareholders, it looks instead as if these compensation formulas
crudely aligned managerial and shareholder interests, but created a socially excessive
incentive for risk-taking. Under this synthesis, shareholders, as principals, simply found
ways to contract with managers, as their agents, to accept greater risk through lucrative
compensation formulas.
But that only brings us back to the centrality of shareholder pressure and the gap
in bank governance between what is privately optimal and what is socially optimal.
Arguably, shareholders of financial institutions were willing to accept high leverage and
risk, not simply because they were diversified, but because they believed that (1) major
banks were “too big to fail,” and (2) the implicit reduction in interest expense charged to
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“too big to fail” banks created an opportunity for “cheap” capital that could not be
spurned. Based on these expectations, shareholders of major financial institutions could
rationally pressure management to accept more risk than shareholders might consider
advisable at industrial corporations.
At this point, it is necessary to disaggregate shareholders. Individual shareholders
may sometimes also be risk averse and disinclined to pressure management toward
greater risk and leverage, but they are a decreasing minority of all shareholders.114 Yet,
not only do institutional investors own a majority of the equity in U.S. public
corporations, but their level of ownership rises to 73% when we focus on the top 1,000
U.S. corporations (among which large financial institutions easily rank).115 Mutual funds
now represent the largest category of institutional owner (in terms of equity holdings).116
Their rise is important because, in comparison to pension funds, mutual funds more
actively compete for the investor’s favor, and their recent investment returns are likely to
heavily influence this competition. As a result, they tend to be more proactive investors.
Historically, pension funds were largely indexed investors, holding large
portfolios that mimicked the broader market. Thus, they were disinclined to become
involved in individual corporate governance disputes, because they could not profit
114
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significantly from them.117 But this is changing. Increasingly, pension funds are
investing their stock portfolios in hedge funds to obtain returns superior to simple
indexing.118 In turn, these hedge funds pursue proactive strategies, and one of their
favorite targets is the underleveraged firm.119
The shareholders’ preference for leverage is complemented (and to a degree made
possible) by the creditors’ continuing expectation that they will be protected in a
federally-assisted rescue of a failing financial institution. When faced with a failing
bank, the federal government has traditionally arranged shotgun marriages through
mergers (with federal assumption of at least some of the failing firm’s liabilities).120 This
was the strategy followed to rescue Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Wachovia during
the 2008 crisis. Under this standard pattern, even if the shareholders of the failed bank
were not protected, its creditors were. Thus, the implicit subsidy in interest rates remains
and should logically continue to motivate shareholders to seek to exploit “cheap”
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financing at the cost of excessive leverage.
From this perspective, it seems ironically counter-productive that the Dodd-Frank
Act actually sought to increase the ability of shareholders to pressure managers, because
such shareholder pressure would predictably often seek to compel managers to increase
leverage and accept greater risk. Yet, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to adopt
rules giving shareholders “access to the proxy statement,”121 enabling dissidents to mount
campaigns for minority seats on the board without having to undertake costly proxy
fights. The SEC responded to this invitation by quickly adopting new Rule 14a-11,
which authorizes dissident shareholders to place their nominees on the corporate board at
low cost.122 Rule 14a-11 could be a desirable counterweight to entrenched managerial
power in much of Corporate America, but again financial institutions are a special case.
Given the natural tension between the social interest in prudent bank regulation and the
shareholder interest in profit maximization through higher leverage, corporate
121
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governance reforms that enhance shareholder power may at the same time weaken
regulatory control over financial institutions.
Still, if the drafters of the Dodd-Frank Act made a misjudgment in seeking to use
shareholders to restrain corporate risk-taking, it was probably a minor error. Close
students of the proxy rules doubt that the “proxy access” rule would have significantly
altered the corporate governance landscape or that the most powerful activists (i.e., hedge
funds) would have used it.123
In fairness to Congress, the Dodd-Frank Act did not rely exclusively on corporate
governance reforms to restrict executive compensation. Rather than depending
exclusively on the fox to guard the executive compensation henhouse, Congress also
enacted a very paternalistic Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which authorized
regulators to prohibit excessive incentive-based compensation at “covered financial
institutions” that “could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial
institution.”124 This was a more direct route to reform, but, as will be seen, financial
regulators appear to be backing away from implementing Section 956 effectively.
B. Systemic Risk and the “Too Big to Fail” Problem
The overriding goal of Dodd-Frank Act was to reduce systemic risk. But dealing
with systemic risk requires that we first understand it. Although there is no universally
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accepted definition of the term,125 most agree that it has three faces:
(1) A financial institution can simply be “too big to fail.” A Citigroup
probably is, but Lehman was perceived not to be.
(2) An institution can be “too connected to fail,” largely as the result of
the increased use of over-the-counter derivatives (including credit
default swaps). As a result, the failure of one can imply the eventual
failure of its counterparties in a cascade of falling financial dominoes.
This scenario explains the Government’s bailout of AIG, upon whom
all other major financial institutions had relied for protection.
(3) Financial institutions can also be too risk correlated to fail, with the
result that the failure of one implies intense stress for the others.
Although uncorrelated risk can be managed through policies such as
diversification, risks that are correlated cannot be similarly resolved or
protected against.
This last face of systemic risk – risk correlation – is probably the least understood and
most dangerous. Because of market pressures (fueled again in part by shareholders
willing to accept risk), large financial institutions are inclined to adopt similar investment
and strategic policies (or face a stock market penalty for their refusal). Thus, in the late
1990s, large financial institutions began aggressively to develop their asset-backed
securitization business, because it appeared to offer the highest return on their capital.
Assume next that one such institution encounters a liquidity crisis (as Bear Stearns did in
early 2008) and must sell illiquid assets (such as interests in asset-backed securitizations)
125
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into a thin market. Prices fall quickly throughout this market, and other financial
institutions are as a result forced to write down their investments in similar assets.
Moreover, short sellers and others realize that trouble at one financial institution signals
distress at other similar institutions and compound the market pressure. This crisis then
feeds on itself, as all these banks begin to sell the same now disfavored investments into
the same, even thinner market.
How can one design an intelligent policy that reduces systemic risk, given the
likelihood that market and shareholder pressures will lead financial institutions to follow
the herd and pursue similar investment policies? Among the obvious options are:
(a) Higher Equity Capital Requirements. Such a strategy makes sense, but
precisely because it will reduce leverage and thus bank profitability, it will be quietly
resisted by banks. A variant on this general technique is to employ “contingent capital” –
namely, a debt security that automatically converts by its terms into an equity security
when the institution encounters a defined level of economic stress.126
(b) A Private, Industry-Funded Insurance System. Such an insurance system is
essentially what the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) manages, and it has
long been the preferred policy of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”). Essentially, it
replaces a public bailout with a private industry bailout, and forces the banking industry
to internalize the costs of higher leverage. Put differently, this approach taxes the
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externality by imposing a charge on the industry to prefund such an insurance fund; this
offsets the externality that arises when TBTF banks are able to borrow funds too cheaply
because of an expected governmental guarantee.127
(c) Reducing Risk Through Prophylactic Rules. A third approach is to reduce the
risk level of TBTF banks by denying them authority to engage in certain higher risk
activities. As discussed later, the “Volcker Rule,” which Dodd-Frank partially adopted,
intends such a result by prohibiting large banks from engaging in proprietary trading or
running hedge funds. Similarly, the now repealed Glass-Steagall Act separated
investment banking from commercial banking in order to protect the latter institutions.
Dodd-Frank mandates only the last of these steps, through a provision popularly
known as “the Volcker Rule.”128 It will be discussed shortly, but it is the primary
exception to the generally accurate generalization that the Dodd-Frank Act did not
mandate stricter standards on TBTF banks (but only authorized regulators to do so). For
example, although Dodd-Frank authorizes the Federal Reserve to impose higher and
more restrictive standards with regard to bank capital and leverage, it did not direct any
specific such action and instead leaves these issues to the discretion of the Federal
Reserve Board (“FRB”) and a new body called the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”).129 At earlier stages in the Dodd-Frank legislation, both the House and Senate
versions of the Act did contain important provisions mandating a private industry
127
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insurance fund (modeled after the FDIC), but these provisions were ultimately deleted at
the conference stage. Why? Populist anger at the costly bailout of the banks
(compounded by resentment over continued high executive compensation in the financial
industry) made any “bailout” proposal politically unacceptable. In addition, some feared
that the existence of such a fund would perpetuate a moral hazard problem, as creditors
would feel protected and continue to lend at a discount.
Instead, Congress’s attention in Dodd-Frank was chiefly directed at prohibiting
future public bailouts by the Federal Reserve or the FDIC. To this end, regulators were
stripped of their former authority to advance funds to major financial institutions facing a
liquidity crisis.130 Yet, it is still not clear that the market really believes that any future
administration could truly tolerate a major bank failure, and many suspect that some
means would be found to evade statutory obstacles in a major crisis. A future
130
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Administration might also be unwilling to liquidate a failing financial institution if its
liquidation would be read politically as a failure of oversight on its part. Even among
experienced practitioners, uncertainty surrounds what will actually happen the next time a
major liquidity crisis erupts and a significant financial institution nears insolvency.131
Possibly, the FDIC could liquidate the bank, but still spare its creditors by forming a
“bridge company” whose debts would be assumed or guaranteed by it.132 As a result, the
market may still consider the creditors of large banks to be protected from failure, and
hence the “too big to fail” subsidy may continue, even if to a reduced degree.
Rightly or wrongly, the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to cut off the possibility of central
bank emergency funding for a bank in distress in order (in part) to end the idea that a
bank can be “too big to fail.” This reverses a policy followed by most central banks since
at least the late 18th Century, when Walter Bagehot defined the role of the central banker
as that of serving as the “lender of last resort.”133 Although a policy of ending emergency
funding is at least a relevant response to the problem of the TBTF subsidy, it is a
Draconian policy that represents a huge gamble.
Put simply, the core problem is that banks are inherently fragile. They (and
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similar financial institutions) are subject to a fundamental mismatch between the shortterm character of their liabilities and the longer-term character of their assets.134
Depositors expect and receive high liquidity, while borrowers expect to repay their loans
over a longer, multiyear period. In good times, banks profit from this “maturity
transformation”, realizing the spread between the lower rate paid depositors and the
higher rate charged borrowers. But, in bad times, banks have been classically subject to
“runs” when depositor confidence is shaken.135
This mismatch is compounded by the practical necessity for a financial institution
of using leverage. Arguably, only banks that employ high leverage can realize the full
economies of scale that are inherent to the banking business. The more that a bank
borrows and lends, the more that it can profit on its fixed costs.
Although investment banks are different from commercial banks in that they do
not have depositors, they are equally subject to the same mismatch of short-term
liabilities and long-term assets, because typically they finance their operations with shortterm, often overnight borrowings in the “repo” market.136 Thus, when the market
suspects that a financial institution is subject to a risk of insolvency, short-term creditors
134
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may stage their own bank “run” by refusing to renew short-term credit lines or vastly
increasing the interest rate. This functional equivalent to a “run” by depositors appears to
have happened not only at Bear Stearns and Lehman, but across the banking system in
2008.137 Yale Economics Professor Gary Gorton has argued that the 2008 panic was
different from most panics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in that it was a
“wholesale” panic, not a “retail” panic, because the market suddenly learned that the
banking system as a whole had become insolvent.138
This point about the “wholesale” character of the crisis explains why reforms such
as private, industry-funded bailout funds are unlikely to prove adequate by themselves.
Insurance can work to avert a crisis when a small percentage of the industry may fail, but
not when a plurality may all fail contemporaneously because of risk correlation. A
private insurance fund might be sufficient to bail out a Lehman (at most), but not the
aggregate of Lehman, Citigroup, and Goldman, Sachs. To the extent that a systemic risk
crisis is provoked by risk correlation, multiple contemporaneous failures become more
likely that could dwarf such a fund. In 2009, much of the financial industry was
threatened and the banking system effectively froze.139
The Dodd-Frank Act’s decision to withdraw traditional emergency lending
authority from the FRB and the FDIC for solvent banks facing only liquidity crises and
its failure to adopt any FDIC-like, prefunded private insurance bailout fund, may prove in
137
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time to have been right or wrong, but they were certainly not the product of the “policy
entrepreneurs” and activist investors that Professors Romano and Bainbridge accuse of
“highjacking” reform legislation. Moreover, because these decisions were essentially
negative ones that took authority away from (or did not extend authority to) financial
regulators, they underscore the importance of the two affirmative steps that the DoddFrank Act did take: (1) It sought to reduce systemic risk at large financial institutions by
adopting the Volcker Rule; (2) It authorized the FRB to adopt higher capital, liquidity
and related prudential standards.
Thus, at the end of the day, the Dodd-Frank Act largely left everything up to the
financial regulators, delegating them discretion but mandating relatively little. Such a
strategy depends on whether effective implementation is possible in the current political
environment, and there are substantial reasons to doubt that it is.
C. The Over-the-Counter (“OTC”) Derivatives Market
The 2008 financial crisis crested when in rapid succession Lehman failed and
AIG was bailed out. Lehman is the paradigm of the bank that arguably was “too big to
fail,” but AIG’s story is more complex. It poses the problem of an opaque technology
whose full impact was not clear. Potentially, AIG’s failure could have sunk far more
counterparties than Lehman ever conceivably threatened.
In response to the AIG episode, the Dodd-Frank Act sought to bring transparency
to the OTC market by mandating the use of clearinghouses, exchange trading of OTC
derivatives, and trade reporting. This effort was entirely rational and may yet be
successful, but it is very much in doubt. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes for
the first time an integrated legal regime for the regulation of the derivatives market,
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assigning security-based swaps to the SEC and other swaps to the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”).140 Although this division perpetuates the U.S. longstanding preference for a multi-peaked regulatory structure, the two agencies seem to be
operating in unison – at least for the time being. Both agencies are seeking to increase the
standardization of swap agreements in order to facilitate their trading through a central
clearinghouse. The key goal is to eliminate counterparty risk for dealers and investors by
replacing the bilateral trading of OTC derivatives with trading through a centralized
clearinghouse.
Yet inevitably, such a restructuring does not eliminate risk, but only shifts it. The
new central clearinghouses will bear the counterparty risk, and the failure of any major
clearinghouse could be an event that would trigger a major systemic risk crisis. Once
again, systemic risk is being concentrated with the creation of another “TBTF”
institution.
Because private mechanisms for dealing with counterparty risk clearly failed in
2008 (and indeed many financial institutions did not require major dealers, including
AIG, to post collateral to secure their trades until the advent of the crisis), the case for use
of clearinghouses is strong, but not without problems. Critics of the idea believe that
clearinghouses are inherently exposed to failure. They argue that clearinghouses will be
bureaucratic institutions less able or willing to assess risk positions in credit default
swaps because they will not be as motivated by profit opportunities as individual
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dealers.141 Others make a related argument: a meaningful reduction of counterparty risk
in swap trading through multilateral netting of investment positions in a clearinghouse
requires that the vast majority of the volume in swaps traded must clear through that
clearinghouse.142 In effect, to work, the clearinghouse must gain a near monopoly.
But here politics intervened. The Dodd-Frank Act contains an important
exemption – known as the “end user exemption” – which exempts from its mandatory
clearing requirement for swaps any counterparty who (1) is not a “financial entity,” (2)
uses the swap to hedge or mitigate commercial risk, and (3) notifies the appropriate
regulatory agency (SEC or CFTC) as to how it generally meets its financial obligations
associated with entering into such non-cleared swaps.143 Politically, this was necessary to
exempt major swap users who might have otherwise been able to block the legislation:
for example, major airlines seeking to hedge the future cost of aviation fuel. Such “end
users” did not wish to be subjected to the minimum capital and margin requirements that
the Dodd-Frank Act imposed on swap dealers.144 The consequence is that much of the
volume in swaps will not be cleared and will escape margin requirements.
The SEC and the CFTC have proposed a joint rule to distinguish the commercial
“end user” from more speculative financial investors in swaps.145 Under it, much of swap
trading will escape the collateral and capital rules that are intended to mitigate systemic
risk. The two agencies cannot be faulted for obeying Congress, but politics has produced
141
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a strange hybrid that could either reduce or exacerbate systemic risk. This vulnerability is
compounded by a second difficulty: non-standardized swap contracts cannot be easily
cleared. Worse yet, forcing complex derivatives into clearinghouses increases the
operational risk for the clearinghouse because it will be required to clear products that it
cannot easily price (and thereby set appropriate margins).146 To the extent that
clearinghouse members have a better more accurate understanding of these risks, they
will possess asymmetric information and may be able to trade to their advantage and the
clearinghouse’s disadvantage.147 Although swap dealers would have to share the costs of
a clearinghouse failure, each has an incentive to trade against the clearinghouse in a way
that in the aggregate increases the risk of systemic failure.
Part IV: The Implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act
The foregoing section has argued that the Dodd-Frank Act is a skeletal structure
that has few affirmative commands but rather is heavily dependent on administrative
implementation. As noted earlier, the financial industry’s best opportunity to nullify
costly regulation is often at the level of administrative implementation. Because (1) the
administrative process is less visible and politically accountable, (2) some agencies (most
notably the FRB) may be too closely aligned with the financial entities they are to
regulate, or (3) the financial industry can both win concessions through negotiations and
then challenge in court those regulations not otherwise watered down, the industry may
win much at the implementation level that it could not achieve at the legislative level. In
addition, the Regulatory Sine Curve concept discussed earlier suggests that regulatory
146
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ardor wanes once the sense of emergency is lost.
Against that backdrop, this article will next survey the progress of the DoddFrank Act’s implementation in three critical areas: (1) the attempt to curb excessive
executive compensation; (2) the effort to end the “TBTF problem” by restricting risky
activities that may cause bank failure; and (3) the effort to move OTC trading out of the
shadows and into the sunlight of greater transparency. It is still premature to evaluate
implementation with respect to the last two objectives, but a fuller assessment is possible
of the effort to curb executive compensation.
A. Curbing Executive Compensation: The Road Not Taken. A major goal of the
Dodd-Frank Act was to reduce the danger of moral hazard by better relating executive
compensation to long-term performance. The Dodd-Frank Act approached this goal by
two distinct means, both of which have now been largely frustrated. Each will be
examined separately.
1. Proxy Access and Corporate Governance. As already noted, the Dodd-Frank
Act instructed the SEC to use the standard inventory of corporate governance reform –
proxy access, “say on pay,” and a restriction on broker voting – to make corporate
managers more accountable to shareholders. As discussed above, this may have been an
ill-advised tactic (at least in the context of large financial institutions where excessive
leverage needs to be discouraged). But vastly overshadowing the significance of the
SEC’s proxy access rule are the implications of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in the
Business Roundtable suit to invalidate that rule. The decision in Business Roundtable v.
SEC148 casts a substantial cloud over the SEC’s ability to adopt other rules, even if not
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related to corporate governance, in implementing the Dodd-Frank Act.
In adopting Rule 14a-11 (the proxy access rule), the Commission relied on
Section 971 of Dodd-Frank Act, which authorized, but did not mandate, the Commission
to adopt such a rule giving shareholders an alternative means by which to nominate and
elect directors.149 Because the Commission had discretion, it was subject to Section 3(f)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires the Commission, when it
determines if a rule is in the public interest, to “also consider, in addition to the protection
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.”150 On its face, this language has a relatively “soft” sound, mandating only
consideration of these impacts, not that the Commission must determine that the interests
of investor protection outweigh those of efficiency, competition and capital formation.
Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit has now several times invalidated SEC rules under this
provision, finding that the Commission has a “statutory obligation to determine as best as
it can the economic implications of the rule.”151
In fact, the SEC did consider several economic studies on the likely impact of
encouraging the election of dissident candidates and expressly noted the limitations of
these studies. In their lawsuit, the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce
asserted both that (1) “the Commission failed to appreciate the intensity with which
issuers would oppose nominees and arbitrarily dismissed the probability that directors
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would conclude their fiduciary duties required them to support their own nominees,”152
and (2) the Commission arbitrarily failed “to estimate the costs of solicitation and
campaigning that companies would incur to oppose candidates nominated by
shareholders. . . .”153 Thus, a rule basically intended to tilt the balance of advantage in
corporate board elections in favor of dissident shareholders was invalidated because the
Commission did not (or could not) estimate the costs of the hostile corporate reaction to
such efforts. By analogy, this is equivalent to invalidating an Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) rule mandating that toxic wastes not be dumped into rivers and
waterways because the EPA had not adequately estimated the costs to companies of
alternative means of disposal.
Still, the relevant issue for this article is the decision’s impact on future SEC
attempts to adopt rules under the Dodd-Frank Act. The critics of SEC attempts to
“federalize” corporate law by mandating corporate governance practices will celebrate
the Business Roundtable decision because it seems to require the Commission to consider
the empirical studies that they feel were disregarded in the enactment of SOX.
Presumably, the D.C. Circuit would not attempt to hold Congress to this same standard,
but to the extent that Congress enacts legislation giving the SEC any discretion as to the
means to be used, the SEC’s exercise of that discretion could be closely reviewed by the
D.C. Circuit under the Section 3(f) standard.
This problem is not limited to SEC rules addressing corporate governance.
Eventually, when the SEC adopts rules implementing the “Volcker Rule” (Section 619 of
the Dodd-Frank Act) or mandating the use of clearinghouses or exchanges for the trading
152
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of security-based swaps, some interest group or individual financial institutions will feel
aggrieved and sue. The outcome of such litigation cannot be predicted today, but it is
sufficiently threatening that an overworked and underfunded SEC may compromise its
rules, watering them down, to avoid the risk of another humiliating decision from the
D.C. Circuit. Although Congress could legislate its own standards without delegating the
matter to administrative agencies, that would imply abandoning the contemporary
administrative state and reliance on administrative expertise. Not since the New Deal has
the prospect of judicial challenge to legislative supremacy loomed as large on the
horizon. To be sure, Congress could curb the D.C. Circuit’s activism, but in the current
polarized political environment such an effort seems unlikely.
2. Section 956. Congress did not rely exclusively (or even primarily) on
corporate governance reforms to curb excessive executive compensation. Section 956 of
the Dodd-Frank Act broadly authorized financial regulators to limit excessive
compensation, but financial regulators have been equivocal in using the powers it
conferred on them. Somewhat vaguely, Section 956 instructed a “covered financial
institution” to disclose to its respective regulator “the structure of all incentive-based
compensation” paid to officers, directors and employees in order to enable the regulator
to prohibit excessive incentive-based compensation “that could lead to material financial
loss to the covered financial institution.”154
The issue was how broadly to construe this disclosure obligation. Although
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Section 956 made clear that it was not requiring the disclosure of the individual
executive’s compensation,155 regulators could have insisted on quantitative data about the
aggregate incentive compensation paid by the firm and its distribution among employees
and executives. What could such disclosure reveal that might be of material interest to
investors? The following chart, taken from a study conducted by then New York
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo of the incentive compensation received in 2008 by
employees of the original TARP recipient financial institutions, shows the disclosures
that could have been mandated under Section 956 (but were not):156
Selected TARP Recipients 2008 Bonus Compensation
No. of
Employees
Receiving
Bonus ≥ $3
million

No. of
Employees
Receiving
Bonus ≥ $1
million

Institution

Earnings /
(Losses)

Bonus Pool

Bank of America

$4 billion

$3.3 billion

28

172

Citigroup, Inc.

$(27.7 billion)

$5.33 billion

124

738

Goldman, Sachs Group

$2.322 billion

$4.823 billion

212

953

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

$5.6 billion

$8.693 billion

≥ 200

1,626

Merrill Lynch

$(27.6 billion)

$3.6 billion

149

696

Morgan Stanley

$1,707 billion

$4.475 billion

101

428

As this chart makes clear, even when financial institutions lost billions, they still paid out
bonuses totaling in the billions to hundreds of employees (see Citigroup and Merrill
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Lynch in the above chart). When the firm did profit, the bonus pool was often a multiple
of earnings (see Goldman, J.P. Morgan, and Morgan Stanley’s in the above chart).
Moreover, practices varied, thus making firm-specific disclosure more important.
Reading the Cuomo data more closely, one finds the following number of employees
receiving over $10 million in bonus compensation in 2008 at these firms: Merrill Lynch
(14); Morgan Stanley (10); J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (10); Goldman Sachs (6); Bank of
America (4); Citigroup (3).157 In sum, the Cuomo data underscores three conclusions: (1)
the bonus culture persisted even in bad times; (2) bonus payments to executives often
exceeded distributions to shareholders; and (3) some individuals received extraordinary
incentive compensation that logically could cause a moral hazard problem.
Revealing as this information may be, disclosure pursuant to Section 956 will not
yield anything remotely equivalent. This is because the major financial regulators have
read Section 956 narrowly. The first interpretive problem posed by Section 956’s broad
language involved identifying those persons whose behavior could inflict “material
financial loss” on their institutions. Only incentive compensation to such persons was
subject to regulation. Obviously, the bank’s janitor cannot ordinarily inflict a “material
financial loss,” but the history of broker-dealer firms suggest that traders often can (as
happened in recent memory at both Barings and Societe Generale).
The principal financial regulators responded in unison to this challenge in April,
2011 with a joint set of rules that each adopted.158 In the case of “covered financial
institutions” (meaning basically any financial institution with total consolidated assets of
157
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$1 billion or more), these rules require an annual report that “describes the structure of
the covered financial institution’s incentive based compensation arrangements . . . that is
sufficient to allow an assessment of whether the structure or features of those
arrangements provide or are likely to provide covered persons with excessive
compensation, fees, or benefits to covered persons or could lead to material financial loss
to the covered financial institution.”159 This is rather general and abstract language, and
no specific data was required. For example, regulators might have followed Andrew
Cuomo’s lead and required disclosure of the number of employees at a firm who received
bonuses of over $1 million in the prior year (even if none were identified by name).
Instead, the new rules do not require disclosure of quantitative data, but only a
generalized narrative description. This seems likely to produce long-winded boilerplate
from securities lawyers adept at covering the waterfront in opaque prose.
In the case of financial institutions with over $50 billion in total consolidated
assets (i.e., the TBTF category), more was required by these regulations. Such institutions
must provide a description of “incentive-based compensation policies and procedures”
for two categories of persons: (1) executive officers, and (2) such “other covered persons
who the board of directors, or a committee thereof, of the covered financial institution has
identified and determined . . . individually have the ability to expose the covered financial
institution to possible losses that are substantial in relation to the covered institution’s
size, capital or overall risk tolerance.”160 Again, this stops well short of revealing the full
depth of the bonus culture at a firm, because many (potentially hundreds of employees)
could receive incentive compensation in the million dollar range and yet be exempted
159
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from disclosure because the board did not believe they could cause a “substantial loss” to
the firm.
In short, only in the case of TBTF institutions do the rules require any specific
disclosure or serious assessment of who could actually cause a substantial loss to the
financial institution, but, even in these cases, the regulations still delegate to each covered
financial institution the determination of who (beyond its executive officers) could
expose it to such a “substantial loss.” This delegation is significant because only the
covered persons so identified (and executive officers) become subject to additional
substantive requirements. In the case of the executive officers of these TBTF institutions,
the proposed rules require deferral of at least 50% of the annual incentive-based
compensation awarded for a period of not less than three years.161 That may or may not
be adequate, but the real surprise in these regulations is that, in the case of those persons
specifically identified by the TBTF institution’s board as being capable of exposing the
institution to “substantial loss,” no deferral was required. Instead, all that was mandated
was that the board or committee must approve the incentive-based compensation
arrangements for such persons and further determine “that the arrangement . . .
effectively balances the financial rewards to the covered person and the range and time
horizon of risks associated with the covered persons activities, employing appropriate
methods for ensuring risk sensitivity, such as deferral of payments . . .”162 In short, the
only requirement for even those persons identified by the firm as being capable of
causing it “substantial losses” is that the board or committee think seriously about
161
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deferral or some other means of ensuring “risk sensitivity.”
The proposed rules thus fall breathtakingly short of adequacy on two major
grounds: (1) they wholly delegate to the firm the decision of who could cause it
“substantial loss,” and (2) even with respect to the persons so identified, the rules require
only process and no minimum deferral.
Why have financial regulators, in common, pulled their punches by (1) requiring
little specific data, (2) allowing the firms to alone decide who (besides executive officers)
can cause them significant loss, and (3) not even requiring some deferral of bonuses by
the persons so identified? The most plausible answer is that regulators knew that a more
effective rule might provoke significant employee defections, as “star” traders (and
others) moved from investment banks to less regulated trading firms. Realistically, the
non-executive officer most likely to be able to cause a substantial loss to a “covered
financial institution” is a trader who is authorized to trade on a large position basis. Such
traders have in recent memory caused staggering losses to some financial institutions
(remember Nicholas Leeson at Barings and Jerome Kervais at Societe Generale).163
Although it is likely that most covered firms will report some employees who can
cause it substantial losses, the number so reported will be likely far below the number
that would be disclosed if more objective criteria were used. Underreporting the number
of such persons has several attractions: (1) it makes the firm appear safer in general; (2)
it spares the board (or committee) the obligation to engage in additional specific
assessments of whether adequate risk sensitivity has been structured into each such
person’s incentive compensation; and (3) it ensures that the persons who otherwise would
163
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be identified as being capable of causing “substantial loss” to the firm will not be
restricted in their compensation by the appropriate regulatory agency. That is, despite the
board or committee’s findings, the relevant regulator might still determine that there was
inadequate risk sensitivity and thus that the compensation was excessive. However, if the
“star” personnel are never so identified, this problem simply does not arise.
To summarize, the problem for the TBTF financial institution was that if highly
compensated “stars” were subjected to the same deferral of incentive compensation as are
executive officers, they might flee “covered financial institutions” to relocate at hedge
funds, smaller banks, or go abroad to escape such controls. Fearing such migration,
financial institutions probably lobbied for a weaker rule (and appear to have succeeded).
Still, the irony is that few vice presidents at a financial institution can cause the same
injury to it as can a star trader (such as such celebrated rogue traders as Jerome Kervais
or Nicholas Leeson).164 The choice for financial regulators was between an effective rule
and some competitive injury to the TBTF banks. The latter consideration appears to have
dominated, and that pattern may recur regularly as the implementation of the Dodd-Frank
Act continues.
Executive compensation was the leading topic on which Congress (pushed by
taxpayers) showed real anger. Still, once the negotiations moved from Congress to the
regulatory agencies, that anger dissipated or at least yielded to concerns about employee
defections and competitive injury. That could happen even more easily in other areas
where the public anger was less intense.
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B. The TBTF Problem. In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress sought to address the
TBTF bank in several ways: (1) providing for “resolution authority” to quickly liquidate
a failed bank without the interminable process of a bankruptcy proceeding;165 (2)
reducing the risk level of banks, including by means of the Volcker Rule;166 and (3)
authorizing stricter prudential standards, including the use of a contingent capital
standard.167 As we have earlier seen with respect to SOX’s prohibition of executive loans
and, most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act’s equivocal executive compensation rules, even
clear Congressional statements can be enervated through administrative interpretation
and underenforcement. Yet, in the case of the Dodd-Frank Act’s approach to TBTF
institutions, the legislation never articulated clear standards to begin with, and equivocal
implementation will likely weaken these standards further.
1. Resolution Authority. The fact that financial regulators, acting in virtual
unison, can liquidate a TBTF institution before it becomes legally insolvent does not
mean that they will actually do so. Such action would imply a black eye for almost any
Administration, suggesting that it had been a poor financial watchdog. Regulators might
also fear that such action would trigger a financial panic. The temptation for regulators is
thus “to kick the can down the road,” hoping for the best and seeing little advantage in
early intervention. Moreover, as the financial industry has grown more concentrated in
the wake of the 2008 failures and consequent mergers, the remaining TBTF banks are
even larger. Thus, any failure of one of them would be more serious. For all these
reasons, the TBTF banks have increased incentives to maintain large lobbying cadres in
165

See Dodd-Frank Act, Title II, Section 201-217 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394).
See Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
167
See Sections 112(a)(2), 115(b), and 165(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5322, 5325, and 5365, respectively).
166

-72-

Washington to protect their interests from adverse actions (which could never occur
quickly in any event, because it would require high coordination and unanimity among
regulators).
Still, suppose a TBTF bank does fail? At this point, the FDIC may be able to
provide financing to a bridge company that acquires most of its assets. It could either
decide to bail out the bondholders or to let them share in the pain in order to end the
TBTF subsidy. The highly discretionary character of this choice suggests it too will invite
heavy lobbying. In turn, the more that bondholders are in fact paid off from an FDIC fund
(and the FDIC can borrow from the FRB for this purpose), the more that the TBTF
subsidy survives. Ultimately, one cannot predict what will happen in any specific case,
but the greater the fear of a financial panic, the more financial regulators are likely to
want to cause bondholders to be paid in full to avert panic. Little may change, and the
TBTF subsidy may persist.
2. The Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule is a coherent response to the TBTF
problem: that is, if banks are too big to fail, they must be regulated so that their risktaking is constrained in order that they do not fail. But the Volcker Rule faces political
problems. First, there is almost no evidence that proprietary trading was responsible for
the failure (or near failure) of any financial institution in the 2008 crisis. In contrast, firms
like Lehman failed because of their principal investments: Lehman made disastrous
acquisitions of major real estate lenders and developers (including SunCal and
Archstone), but those acquisitions, which made it undiversified and overleveraged, fell
well outside the definition of proprietary trading in the Dodd-Frank Act. In this respect,
the Volcker Rule is seriously underinclusive because it exempts principal investments
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from its ban, despite the Lehman experience.
Second, Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which expresses the Volcker Rule,
contains numerous loopholes and exceptions.168 Chief among these are exceptions for
hedging and market making by the covered financial institution. The financial regulators
have recently released their proposed draft of the Volcker Rule.169 On a preliminary
review, it seems potentially tougher and more restrictive than many had expected. Still,
the start of the process is not the end of the process, and opposition to it is mounting.170
Always opportunistic, the financial services industry has seized on the crisis in European
sovereign debt to warn that the Volcker Rule’s implementation will curtail the demand
for European sovereign debt and aggravate that crisis.171 Here again, the experience with
SOX may be repeated, with the proposed rules on proprietary trading being watered
down.
3. Contingent Capital. One of the most original ideas proposed to avert TBTF
debacles is a requirement that some portion of the financial institution’s debt securities be
required, in the original bond contract, to convert into an equity security if the financial
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institution begins to approach insolvency.172 Although the original idea was to convert
the debt to equity on the doorsteps of insolvency, much more can be done with this
flexible idea. Uniquely, it provides an ex ante tool. As the stock price of the institution
declines, debt could convert at several stages on an incremental basis into an equity
security, thereby diluting the equity and punishing the stockholders for their pursuit of
higher leverage and risk-taking. Used this way, the tool has a prospective deterrent
power. This author has proposed conversion of the debt into a voting preferred stock,
whose holders would have incentives naturally aligned with other debt holders and
adverse to the common stockholders.173 The goal is again to create a counterbalancing
constituency that would resist shareholder pressure.
Other innovative designs are possible, but the likelihood is high that the Federal
Reserve will ignore all these possibilities. Instead, it will likely propose that contingent
capital be used only as a form of prepackaged bankruptcy. If insolvency has become
inevitable, even the financial industry recognizes that it would be quicker and simpler to
convert much of the debt into equity than utilize the cumbersome procedures of
resolution authority. The banking community would probably also prefer such a modest
use of contingent capital because it reduces the uncertainty incident to a liquidation and
avoids the mandatory ouster of responsible management that is required under
“resolution authority.”
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Still, such a minimal use of contingent capital is myopic. It surrenders the
possibility of ex ante measures that could precede and avert insolvency. But if anything
can be safely predicted, it is that the Federal Reserve is too closely imbedded within the
banking community to propose any intrusive remedy that would be invoked well before a
banking crisis has begun.
C. The Legislative Counterattack. As of early 2012, legislation is pending that
would severely curtail many of the corporate governance provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act.174 Essentially, the legislation would create a new category of issuer called an
“emerging growth company,” which would be exempt from many of the provisions of the
proxy rules, including the Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions as “say on pay” and related
compensation disclosures, as well as Section 404(b) of SOX.175 The term “emerging
growth company” is broadly defined to include any issuer that has annual gross revenues
of less than $1 billion and that has a public float of less than $700 million.176 The
174
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rationale for this broad exemption is that it would spur job creation by encouraging
smaller companies to conduct initial public offerings. This rationale is doubtful, because
the decline in IPOs, while real, dates back at least to the burst of the Internet IPO bubble
in 2001 and thus could hardly have been caused by either the Dodd-Frank Act or SOX’s
Section 404. Many other factors better explain the decline in IPOs than any increase in
regulatory costs after 2001.177
Still, such proposals chiefly demonstrate the continuing impact of the Regulatory
Sine Curve. In 2011, financial industry representatives formed an industry study group,
which called itself the “IPO Task Force,” and it quickly prepared a report attributing the
decline in IPOs to regulatory and market structure changes.178 Entirely ignored by this
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John Coates, Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, Senate Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, Hearing on
“Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising,” December 14, 2011 (available on LEXIS).
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See IPO Task Force Report. For a more affirmative discussion of this report by its chairman,
see Testimony of Kate Mitchell before House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital
Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises Hearing on “Reopening American Capital
Markets to Emerging Growth Companies Act of 2011” on December 15, 2011 (available on
LEXIS). Her testimony does not focus on any of the provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act as a
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report was the likely loss in investor confidence following the burst of the Internet stock
bubble. The IPO Task Force proposed to remedy the decline in IPOs by dismantling
many of the regulatory changes that were adopted following the 2001 market crash.179
Time and again, this is the key move: to blame economic stagnation and job loss,
not on a crash or a bubble, but on the regulation that follows it. The legislation proposed
by the IPO Task Force has broad bipartisan support and is one of several deregulatory
proposals that seem likely to pass Congress as part of a job creation program.180 Although
it will likely accomplish little in terms of reversing the decline in initial public offerings,
this legislation will ease constraints imposed on the financial services industry. Above all,
this episode shows again that, once a crisis has passed, Congress can easily be persuaded
significant barrier to an IPO, but does identify SOX’s Section 404(b) as the most costly barrier to
becoming a public company. Still, if so, this diagnosis hardly leads to a prescription of rolling
back the Dodd-Frank Act.
179
In particular, the IPO Task Force Report would override the existing rules of FINRA and
permit securities analysts associated with an underwriter who is participating in the offering to
issue reports on the issuer at the time of the offering. Today, FINRA Rule 2711 precludes a
managing underwriter from distributing a research report about an issuer client until 40 days after
the registration statement becomes effective (and other underwriters in the offering are similarly
precluded for 25 days). This was a rule adopted by an industry self-regulatory body, not
Congress, and these rules were adopted in response to the 2000-2002 controversy involving
Internet securities analysts, most notably Henry Blodgett and Jack Grubman, who became iconic
examples of conflicted securities analysts as a result of enforcement actions undertaken by then
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. Nonetheless, the IPO Task Force displays a collective
amnesia about these conflicts, and Congress appears unable to resist the seductive argument that
deregulation means job creation.
180
A number of bills are pending and seem likely to pass in 2012 that would enable smaller
companies to avoid either or both of the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 or
the reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For detailed reviews of them,
see Coates, supra note 177 and Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A Berle Professor of
Law, Columbia University Law School, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, on “Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors,”
December, 2011. It is not the contention of this article that these bills undermine the federal
securities laws, but only that they show a recurrent pattern of thinking that considers only the
costs of regulation and not the cost of crashes and bubbles. Absent restored investor confidence or
major technological breakthroughs, there is little prospect of an upsurge in the number of IPOs.
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to repeal legislation that it passed in response to the crisis. This does not prove that the
original legislation was flawed, but only that Congress can be manipulated and, absent
some countervailing force, has a limited attention span and will sometimes accept
makeweight arguments. To be sure, in a national crisis, countervailing forces sometimes
arise, but they do not remain organized and vigilant indefinitely – hence, the regulatory
sine curve persists.
CONCLUSION
The key and recurring debate over financial reform is between those who distrust
both legislation and regulation (a position that the Tea Party Caucus exemplifies) and
those who believe strong regulation is necessary to restrain systemic risk. In this debate,
the standard move of those who distrust regulation is to attribute economic stagnation and
job loss to costly regulation, ignoring that the costs of market bubbles and crashes dwarf
those of regulation. Their ability to do this (and frankly with some success) is evidence of
a collective social amnesia that appears to overtake Congress and others, as soon as the
crisis fades from the headlines. This recurrent amnesia is in turn the product of what this
article has termed the Regulatory Sine Curve – a cycle that is driven by the differential in
resources, organization, and lobbying capacity that favors those interests determined to
resist further regulation.181
Without doubt, some regulation is foolish and overbroad, but the point
emphasized by this article is that such overbroad regulation is usually repealed or
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This disparity will only grow in the wake of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010) (First Amendment protects independent expenditures in support of a political
candidate from governmental regulation limiting such contributions). For the finding that
corporate political and lobbying expenditures are increasing in the wake of this decision, see John
C. Coates IV, Corporate Politics, Governance and Value Before and After Citizens United,
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975421) (December 22, 2011).
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curtailed relatively quickly (and without the need for mandatory sunsets). The greater
danger is that the forces of inertia will veto or block all change. The pervasive
underregulation of “shadow banking,” which has continued for decades, appears to have
been a leading cause of the 2008 financial debacle and the current economic stagnation.
Failing meaningful implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, financial executives may
once again race like lemmings over the financial cliffs by taking on leverage that they
cannot sustain. One cannot pretend to predict when this will occur, but driving this
process will be the same perverse incentives: basically, short-term executive
compensation and market pressure for higher leverage and greater risk-taking. These root
causes will again be aided and abetted by equivocal regulation and bounded rationality.
In short, history repeats itself, particularly when it is ignored. In truth, the DoddFrank Act potentially faces even greater downsizing than SOX has experienced. This is
because its effective implementation requires greater regulatory encroachment into the
core business decisions of financial institutions over their capital adequacy, leverage, and
compensation. Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act seems destined to be resisted even more
aggressively than SOX was. If, however, the Dodd-Frank Act is similarly neutralized by
a combination of equivocal rule-making and legal challenges, the consequences may be
far more ominous. Systemic risk poses a far greater threat to both the United States and
the world’s economy than did the corporate governance failures and accounting
irregularities to which SOX responded.
It is not the contention of this article that sustained reform is impossible or that, in
response to a crisis, regulatory agencies are only capable of “rearranging the deck chairs
on the Titanic.” That would overstate. Indeed, political entrepreneurs who unite and
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sustain a political coalition of investors and enable them to resist better-funded special
interest groups would be the heroes of this story – if only such actors were more
visible.182 In the absence of such leaders, the first and reflexive response of many
regulatory agencies after a crash is simply to move the deck chairs around in a
sufficiently noisy fashion to show that they are on the job. Some evidence suggests that is
again happening.183 Beyond this lack of imagination and political nerve, the greater
problem is that financial regulators are often so closely intertwined with those that they
regulate that they respond in an equivocal and even timid fashion.184 The recent and joint
rules on executive compensation adopted by the principal federal financial regulators
exemplify this problem because the limited reach of these rules seems motivated more by
a desire to protect the industry from competition than to control moral hazard.
What could be done to compensate for the predictable tendency toward rapid
erosion of reform legislation? Arguably, one could advocate the use of stronger
prophylactic rules in the original reform legislation with less delegation to administrative
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As earlier suggested (see supra at note 8), Eliot Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo have at times
played the “public entrepreneur” role, but the SEC has been far more cautious and bureaucratic.
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An excellent example is the SEC’s latest release containing proposed rules for credit rating
agencies. See SEC Release No. 34-64514 (“Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations”) (May 18, 2011). The release contains voluminous rules governing the
training and supervision of credit rating agency employees, but never recognizes that the
underlying problem was not their lack of competence, but conflicts of interest and the pressure on
them. See Coffee, Ratings Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 1 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 231
(2011).
184
This may be because of the “revolving door” phenomenon, risk aversion about the political or
reputational consequences of a litigation defeat, or budgetary constraints that limit the agency’s
ability to engage in aggressive enforcement. No attempt is here made to disentangle the various
causes. Finally, fear of judicial reversal may also cause the regulator to trim its sails and propose
only equivocal rules.
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agencies.185 Such a proposal would be the polar opposite of Professor Romano’s
mandatory sunset rule. Although such a shift would be logical, this article still stops short
of making any across-the-board such recommendation because it would entail
undesirable rigidity. A second best substitute may be to use market-based reforms that
use objective market tests and thus depend less on administrative implementation.186
While disclosure is always a useful remedy, it needs to be refocused. Hopefully, the
financial press might be persuaded to focus more on weak or equivocal administrative
implementation. Some courts may also embarrass the SEC into stronger enforcement
action.187 It is premature, however, to evaluate these options until the implementation of
the Dodd-Frank Act is further along.
“Capture” is an overused and underdefined term. This article does not assert that
financial regulators have been captured, but does conclude that they are far better at
prosecuting outliers and crooks than in controlling reckless ambition by those at the top
of the corporate hierarchy. To be sure, some desirable reforms will emerge from the
Dodd-Frank Act that will reduce the risk (marginally at least) of another systemic risk
crisis for the immediate future. Predictably, capital adequacy standards will be raised and
leverage ratios marginally restricted at TBTF institutions. But the pursuit of higher
leverage has not yet been checked. The acid test for meaningful reform is likely to lie in
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The Securities Exchange Act does contain several such prophylactic rules. For example,
Section 16(b) of that Act broadly prohibits “short swing” trading without any need to prove
scienter or the possession of material information. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p. The Public Utility
Company Act of 1935’s infamous “death sentence” for holding companies would be another
example. See supra note 17.
186
For such a proposal, see Coffee, supra note 126.
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See text and note supra at note 93 (discussing Judge Rakoff’s refusal to accept proposed SEC
settlements).
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the outcomes in three areas: (1) the implementation of the Volcker Rule,188 (2) the fate of
the Dodd-Frank Act’s preference for trading OTC derivatives through exchanges and
clearinghouses, and (3) the strength of the capital adequacy rules for TBTF banks.189 In
each case, the exceptions may overwhelm the rule.
Across all the financial regulatory agencies, the deep seated preference is to
depend upon bureaucratic oversight and monitoring in preference to more prophylactic
rules. But, as prior market crashes have shown, the same cognitive limitations that blind
market participants also cloud the vision of regulators. More objective, market-based
tests are possible and desirable,190 but they have no constituency supporting them. As a
result, the same regulators who missed the Long-Term Capital Management crisis in
1998, the IPO Bubble in 2000, the Enron and WorldCom failures in 2001-2002, the
market timing scandal in mutual funds in 2004, Bernie Madoff in 2008 and the Lehman
and AIG collapses in 2008 seem likely in time to do it again. Bounded rationality
compounded by the Regulatory Sine Curve implies that eventually we will face another
systemic risk crisis.
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Two experienced partners at Davis, Polk (one a former SEC Commissioner) have recently
predicted that financial regulators will be forced to withdraw their 298 page proposal to
implement the Volcker Rule and in effect start over by reproposing it. See Annette L. Nazareth
and Gabriel D. Rosenberg, “Comment: 12 regulatory reform predictions for ’12,” Financial
Times, December 23, 2011. If this happens, a significantly weaker rule will likely follow.
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The Federal Reserve has announced enhanced capital adequacy rules, but not more stringent
than those that would be required by Basel III. The New York Times described the proposal as “a
small victory for banks.” See Edward Wyatt, “Fed Unveils Plan to Limit Chance of a Banking
Crisis,” New York Times, December 21, 2011 at B-1.
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For a discussion of possible market-based tests to supplement regulatory oversight, see Coffee,
supra note 126, at 828-846.
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